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Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing
already, given and transmitted from the past.
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx.

PART ONE: AGRICULTURE
INTRODUCTION
Assessing the nature and direction of economic development in India is an
important theoretical and practical task with profound political and social
implications. After all, any serious attempt at a radical restructuring of Indian
society, if it is not to fall prey to empty utopianism, will need to base its long-term
strategy on the historical trends in the evolution of the material conditions of life of
the vast majority of the population. Attempting to build on past debates and as part
of on-going attempts at radical transformation of Indian society, this paper tries to
provide a summary account of the evolution of some key structural features of the
Indian economy over the last few decades.
In providing this summary account, we connect with and speak to issues thrown up
by earlier work on characterizing Indian society. The primary, though implicit,
reference point for this paper is the “mode of production” debate that occupied
scholars and activists in India during the 1970s and 1980s.1 This paper is an
attempt to revisit that debate in the light of new data that has since become
available; it is also an attempt to widen the analytical and empirical focus beyond
the agricultural sector, the sole concern of the “mode of production” debate. While
it is true that agriculture continues to “employ” the vast majority of the working
people in India, the last few decades have also witnessed the slow and erratic
growth of an industrial and services sector. A large part of the working class now
constantly shuttles between these sectors, as much as they physically move
between regions and states. Hence it is important to include this growing nonagricultural sector in any analysis of the evolution of the Indian economy.
The principal questions that motivate this study are: what types of production
relations does the vast majority of the working population in Indian agriculture and
industry labor in? How is economic surplus appropriated from the direct producers?
The aim is to understand the material conditions under which the working
population labors and the manner in which it is exploited.
The analysis is largely pitched at the aggregate level, complemented, wherever
possible, with micro-level studies and data. While a study of the structural evolution
1

Thorner (1982a, 1982b, 1982c) summed up the debate and Patnaik (1990) contains a selection of the key articles.
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of the Indian economy is of interest in itself, this paper uses trends in the structural
evolution of the Indian economy to make inferences about the mode of generation,
appropriation and use of the surplus product in Indian society.2 The focus on surplus
appropriation, in turn, is motivated by the Marxist idea that the form of extraction of
unpaid surplus labour provides the key to understanding the structure and evolution
of any class-divided society. This important insight was most clearly articulated by
Marx in Volume III of Capital:
“The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of
the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude,
as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a
determinant. On this is based the entire configuration of the economic
community arising from the actual relations of production, and hence also its
specific political form. It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners
of the conditions of production to the immediate producers - a relationship
whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of
development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social
productive power - in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of
the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship
of sovereignty and dependence, in short the specific form of the state in each
case.” (page 927, Marx, 1993; emphasis added.)
The emphasis on the form in which surplus labour is extracted from the direct
producers is important and worth dwelling on a little. Every class divided society
rests on the appropriation of unpaid surplus labour of the direct producers; the fact
that one group of people can, due to their location in the process of production and
their relationship to the means of production, appropriate the surplus labour of
another group is what defines a class. The appropriation of the surplus labour of
direct producers by the ruling class is as much true of a feudal organization of
production as it is of a capitalist mode of production. What distinguishes the two is
the form in which this surplus labour is appropriated by the ruling classes, not the
fact of surplus extraction per se. It is only in the capitalist mode of production that
the surplus labour of the direct producers, i.e., the workers, takes the form of
surplus value and is mediated through the institution of wage-labour. While this
makes the exploitation of workers less apparent under capitalism, it also
distinguishes the capitalist mode of production from non-capitalist modes, where
the appropriation of surplus labour is much more visible, direct and brutal. For
instance, in the feudal organization of society in Medieval Europe, the surplus labour
of the serf was immediately visible as the work he did on the lord’s land; the surplus
labour took the form of the product of the serf’s labour. The visibility of exploitation,
understood as the appropriation of unpaid labour time of the direct producers, is
lost under capitalist relations of production; it is obscured by the institution of wagelabour.
2

For an incisive analysis of the use of the notion of surplus for economic analysis see Baran (1957).
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This study attempts to identify the evolution of the modes of appropriation of
surplus labour in India indirectly by studying the evolution of key structures of the
Indian economy at the aggregate level. The underlying assumption of the whole
study is that the evolution of the aggregate economic structures, like ownership
patterns in the agrarian economy, the evolution of labour forms like tenancy, wagelabour, bonded labour, the size-distribution of firms in the informal sector, the
patterns of employment and migration, the importance of merchant and finance
capital, etc., can provide useful and reliable information about the mode of surplus
extraction. While it is possible to form a picture of the aggregate evolution of the
Indian economy using data available from sources like the National Sample Survey
Organization (NSSO), the Agricultural Census, the Census of India – and that is
precisely what we do in this study - we are fully aware of the limitations of such
aggregate accounts. Many micro-level variations are lost in the aggregate story and
so, wherever possible, the aggregate picture is complemented with case studies.
The study is broadly divided into two sections, one dealing with the agrarian
economy and the other with what has come to be called the “informal” industrial
sector. This twin focus is motivated by several considerations. First, the agrarian
economy accounts for the largest section of the country’s workforce and population;
this makes it a natural focus of any study which attempts to understand the
evolution of the Indian economy and society at the aggregate level. Second, while
the non-agrarian economy consists of the industrial and the services sector, the
majority of the workforce in these two sectors is, again, found in what has been
called the “informal” sector; that is why this becomes one of the foci of this study.
Third, to the extent that an understanding of the relations of production (and forms
of surplus extraction) is at issue, the “formal” industrial and services sector are
probably beyond the domain of any debate; most serious scholars and activists
would agree that the “formal” sector is characterized by capitalist relations of
production. Since, what seems to be at issue is the “correct” characterization of the
relations of production and forms of surplus extraction in the agrarian economy and
the non-agricultural “informal” sector, this study focuses on precisely these two as
an intervention in the broader debate about the characterization of Indian society.

PART I: AGRICULTURE
Framed in the backdrop of massive mobilization of the rural poor against intolerable
conditions of existence in the late 1960s, expressed politically in the eruption of the
Naxalite movement and its brutal suppression by the Indian state, the “mode of
production” debate brought together some of the most prominent Marxist social
scientists in India in their attempt to characterize the agrarian structure in India.
Was it capitalist or was it semi-feudal? What were the main classes in rural society?
How should India’s relationship with imperialism be factored into the
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characterization of Indian society? What kind of revolutionary political strategy
followed from the political economic analysis? These were some of the main
questions around which the debate was organized.
The time is probably ripe for revisiting this debate, for going back and taking
another look at the issues raised and the questions asked. There are at least two
reasons for this. First and foremost, we are probably once again witnessing the
mobilization of the rural poor against the continued poverty and misery that has
become their lot under the post-colonial Indian state. The numerous peoples’
movements, ranging from anti-SEZ (Special Economic Zone) struggles and
movements against displacement and for rights over common property resources to
the Maoist movement, are political expressions of this enormous rural churning.
This provides a backdrop which is very similar to that provided by the late 1960s in
India; this backdrop, this objective reality of peoples’ struggles, impels us to once
again ask fundamental questions about the structure and dynamics of Indian
society. Second, more than two decades have elapsed since the “mode of
production” debate ended in the early 1980s; these two and a half decades have
seen several changes in the direction of policy of the Indian state, the most notable
being the wholesale adoption of the neoliberal economic framework. Did this policy
change impinge on the structure of the Indian economy? If so how? With the
passage of time, we also have access to more and possibly better quality data
about the Indian economy; this new data can be fruitfully used to empirically
evaluate many of the claims thrown up during the “mode of production” debate. It
is for all these reasons, and with motivations very similar to those of the
participants in the previous debate, that we wish to revisit the mode of production
debate, starting with an analysis of the agricultural sector and then moving on to
the “informal” industrial/services sector.
A. SECTORAL COMPOSITION AND AVERAGE SIZE OF HOLDINGS
Probably nothing gives a better introduction to the grim story of Indian agriculture
than a simple picture of the sectoral composition of the three sectors of the Indian
economy, in terms of share of total value added and share of total employment.
While the share of value added coming from agriculture has declined sharply from
around 56% in 1950 to about 17% in 2007, the share of the total labour force
engaged in agricultural activities has displayed a much slower decline, as shown in
Table 1. This has effectively trapped the largest section of the Indian workforce, for
lack of alternative employment opportunities, in an extremely low productivity
sphere of production, leading to extremely low incomes and consumption
expenditures. The continued reliance of a large majority of the population on
agriculture, which adds an ever declining share of the value added to GDP, clearly
underlines the failure of any meaningful structural transformation of the Indian
economy over the last five decades since political independence.
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Table 1: Sectoral Composition of GDP and Labour Force
Agriculture
Industry
Services
share
share
share
share
of
share
of
share
of
of
labour
of
labour
of
labour
GDP
force
GDP
force
GDP
force
2007
16.60
60.00
28.40
12.00
55.00
28.00
2000
24.60
59.30
26.60
18.20
48.80
22.40
1980
38.90
68.10
24.50
13.90
36.60
18.60
Source: Various Economic Surveys of India.
With the majority of the working population in India engaged in agricultural
activities, and with land being one of the most important “inputs” in agricultural
production, one is naturally led to enquire into the evolution of average size of
landholdings and other aspects related to ownership of land in rural India. One of
the key facts about the evolution of the agrarian structure in India over the last five
decades is the steadily declining size of agricultural holdings as depicted in Chart 1
(see Table A1 for details). 3

The average size of ownership holdings has declined monotonically over the last
few decades, with a value that is currently even less than half the corresponding
value in the early 1960s. Not surprisingly, the same pattern of monotonic decline is
observed in terms of both ownership and operational holdings, where operational
holdings can have more or less land than ownership holdings because of leasing in
3

Tables with numbers starting with “A” have been collected together in the Appendix.
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and leasing out of land. The declining size of agricultural holdings point towards
processes leading to fragmentation of land, important among them being continued
demographic pressures on a fixed quantity of land and lack of employment
opportunities in the industrial sector. The average size of holdings obtaining in India
today also has important implications for the agenda of redistributive land reforms,
as traditionally envisaged within the left political tradition; we will comment on this
in a later section.

B. PATTERNS OF LAND OWNERSHIP
Understanding the class forces currently working in agriculture requires us to look
not only at the evolution of the average size of holdings but also at the aggregate
ownership patterns of land in the rural economy. The steady decline in average size
of holdings has been accompanied by some striking changes in the pattern of
ownership of land in rural India. To better appreciate the changing structure of
ownership patterns of land in rural India, let us define the following commonly used
ownership size-classes: all families owning less than 1 hectare of land will be called
“marginal” farmers; all families owning between 1 and 2 hectares will be called
“small” farmers; all families owning between 2 and 4 hectares will be called “semimedium” farmers; all families owning between 4 and 10 hectares will be called
“medium” farmers; and all families owning more than 10 hectares will be called
“large” farmers. This information is summarized for easy reference in Table 2.

Table 2: Size-class Definition
Size-Class
Area Owned
marginal
< 1 hectares
small
1 – 2 hectares
semi-medium 2 – 4 hectares
medium
4 – 10 hectares
large
> 10 hectares

With this definition of the various size-classes, we can see that the proportion of
marginal farmer households has increased steadily over the last four decades,
increasing from about 66 percent in 1961 to about 80 percent of all rural
households in 2003. This rather large increase in the share of marginal farmer
households has been matched by a steady decline of large, medium and semimedium farmer households: large and medium farmer households together
comprise a minuscule 3.6 percent of rural households in rural India today; in 1961,
this category represented about 12 percent of all rural households. Between the
decline in the share of large landholding families and the increase in the share of
marginal farmer families, the “small” farmer family has managed to more or less
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maintain its share constant over the past five decades, increasing marginally from 9
percent to 11 percent of all rural households between 1961 and 2003.
The pattern of ownership in terms of the share of total area owned more or less
matches the pattern observed with respect to the share of households in the rural
areas, though the pace of change is more rapid in this case. The share of total area
owned by marginal and small farmer families has steadily increased from 8 percent
of total area in 1961 to about 23 percent of total area owned in 2003. Paralleling
this is the steady decline in the share of total area owned by large and medium
farmer households: the share of area owned by “large” households declined from
28 percent in 1961 to about 12 percent in 2003; the corresponding share owned by
“medium” households declined from 31 percent in 1961 to about 23 percent in
2003. Caught between these two trends is the semi-medium farmer family which
has kept its share in the total area owned more or less constant since 1971 at
around 20 percent. The changing pattern of ownership of land is depicted
graphically in Chart 2 and Chart 3 (see Table A2 for details).
Has this changing pattern of land ownership made the distribution of this most
important asset more equitable? The answer is a resounding no. Though the share
of area owned by large landholding families has declined substantially over the past
few decades, driven most probably by demographic pressures and by some halfhearted attempts at land reforms, the resulting distribution of land at the beginning
of the twenty first century in India cannot be seen as more equitable than it was five
decades ago. In fact, the skewed nature of the distribution of land remains more or
less intact, as can be seen from the following three measures: the Gini’s coefficient
of ownership distribution, the Lorenz curve for the ownership distribution and the
average area owned by size-classes. The Gini coefficient of ownership concentration
was 0.73 in 1961-62, 0.71 thereafter till 1992 and then changed to 0.74 in 2003
(Government of India, 2006; pp. 12); the Lorenz curve for the ownership distribution
has also more or less remained unchanged between 1961-62 and 2003
(Government of India, 2006; pp. 13).
Inequality of land ownership can also be understood by studying the evolution of
the average size of holding by ownership size-classes. Studying this measure
answers the following two questions: (a) how has the average landholding of
different size-classes evolved over time, and (b) what is the average size of
landholding of the marginal peasant household as compared to, for instance, the
medium or large peasant household? As can be seen from Table 3, the average size
of holding for the marginal farmers has remained remarkably stable over the last
five decades at a value of around 0.2 hectares; the average size for all the other
size-classes has declined, with the largest proportional fall recorded by small
farmers and the smallest by the category of semi-medium farmers.
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Year
1961
1971
1982
1992
2003

Table 3: Area Owned per Household by Ownership Size-Class
Marginal
small
semi-medium
medium
0.20
2.41
2.84
6.13
0.24
1.45
2.81
6.00
0.23
1.44
2.80
5.92
0.24
1.40
2.68
5.80
0.21
1.38
2.67
5.62

large
17.64
16.53
16.29
15.87
14.05

Source: calculated from Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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When we approach the inequality of land ownership by looking at the sizes of
average holdings across size-classes relative to the average size of the marginal
farmer household’s ownership area, we find confirmation of the story of continued
inequality. The relative size of average holdings across the ownership size classes,
in comparison to marginal holdings, has declined but remains substantially large
even today. For instance, as summarized in Table 4, the average large holding was
about 67 times the size of the average marginal holding in 2003; the average
medium holding was about 27 times the size of the average marginal holding. While
the former has declined from about 86 in 1961, the latter has declined much less,
from about 30 in 1961 to 27 in 2003. Thus, the degree of aggregate inequality in
ownership has remained largely intact through these five decades.
Year
1961
1971
1982
1992
2003

Table 4: Multiple of Average Marginal Holding by Ownership Size-Class
Marginal
small
semi-medium
medium
1
11.77
13.90
29.97
1
6.08
11.78
25.18
1
6.12
11.93
25.22
1
5.88
11.25
24.38
1
6.52
12.65
26.57

Large
86.27
69.33
69.40
66.73
66.48

Source: calculated from Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
The skewed distribution of land ownership of course in itself does not provide very
useful information about the dominant relations of production prevailing in the
agrarian economy and modes of surplus extraction most in use; a predominantly
feudal mode of production can have a skewed ownership distribution as much as a
predominantly capitalist mode of production. Many participants in the “mode of
production” debate in India in the 1970s, and especially Patnaik (1972a, 1972b,
1976, 1980, 1986), drew attention to the fact that the acreage or size of agricultural
holdings per se cannot be used to infer the class status, in the Marxist sense, of the
owner of the holding or the relations she/he enters into with other classes in rural
society. The same size of holdings can go with very different ways of organizing
production, i.e., capitalist or semi-feudal, depending on the availability of water,
power, fertilizers, draught animals, other tools and implements, etc. Hence, the
same size-class of ownership or operational holding might have members from very
different classes.
While this argument is theoretically valid, we might nonetheless use the average
size-class of ownership holdings as a proxy, decidedly approximate, for the class
position of the owner of the holding. This is a purely empirical argument and follows
from the following two observed facts: (a) there is a very strong positive correlation
between the size of land possessed and the ownership of animals, minor tools and
implements (like sickles, chaff-cutters, axes, spades and choppers) and tractors
(Statement 2, Government of India, 2005); and (b) if we define, following Patnaik
(1976), the rural classes as full-time labourer, poor peasant, middle peasant, rich
peasant, capitalist and landlord, then the proportion of the “upper classes” tend to
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increase as we move from smaller to larger sizes of ownership holdings. The second
assertion, which seems fairly intuitive, is partly reflected in Patnaik (1980). In her
sample of 236 households, of those owning between 2.5 and 10 acres, the majority
were small peasants; of those owning between 10 and 15 acres, the majority were
middle peasants. Even though Patnaik (1980) did not use a random sample and the
sample size was small, we can probably still make the claim that size of holding
provides a good approximation of the class position of the owner.
But we do not want to attach more importance to acreage than to use it as a rough
indicator of class status. Hence, we supplement the above data on aggregate
ownership patterns with the following variables: (1) geographical variation of land
ownership across Indian states, (2) the extent of tenancy, both over time and across
space, (3) evolution of the pattern of tenancy relations, (4) the extent and growth of
landlessness, (5) the major sources of income of rural households, (6) the pattern of
capital accumulation in the agricultural sector, and (7) sources of credit in the rural
economy. Taken together with the evolution of the pattern of land ownership, these
might help us construct a broad picture about the relations of production and the
predominant modes of surplus extraction in the agrarian economy.
Before we look at evidence on these important features of the rural economy, we
would like to address two possible criticisms: (1) neglect of any discussion of the
post-independence Zamindari Abolition Acts, and (2) not recognizing the
importance of irrigation and differential productivities of land.
The discerning reader might find it surprising that we do not discuss the Zamindari
Abolition Acts while discussing the transformation of the agricultural sector in India;
can this be considered a serious lapse of our analysis? We think not. Zamindari
Abolition Acts and their impacts have been discussed threadbare by several
scholars like Daniel Thorner, Wolf Ladejinsky, F Tomason-Januzzi, Francine Frankel,
and others. Most serious scholars have pointed out that the Zamindari Abolition
Acts, passed in several provincial legislatures between 1949 and 1954, fell far short
of transforming the agrarian structure. These acts did not manage to seriously
appropriate the land of the zamindars and therefore did not manage to curb the
power of the landed elite as a class in rural society. Despite the passage of several
variants of these “abolition acts”, zamindari interests managed to cleverly use legal
loopholes to their advantage, challenging key components of the Acts and thereby
managed to severely limit the effectiveness of the already timid legal provisions.
The case of Bihar is only too well known to bear repetition. Frankel (2005) summed
up the consensus view quite well: the State managed to abolish the zamindari
system without expropriating the zamindars. Zamindari Abolition Acts did not
transform the rural class structure in any significant manner; hence, we did not feel
necessary to devote space to a discussion of these legal provisions and changes.
The second possible objection that we would like to address consists of two related
points: (a) that we ignore the issue of productivity differentials, especially the
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differential productivity of land that exists between irrigated and non-irrigated
areas; and (b) that this productivity differential makes state-level or national-level
analysis largely useless.
It is true that the size (of the agricultural unit) and surplus produced (leaving aside
for the moment the production relations under which surplus is being produced)
have a complex relationship co-determined by technological and geographical
variables. A small plot in a dry area will produce much less surplus than a small plot
in a well-irrigated area; a small fruit orchard will produce more by way of income
than a small subsistence plot. But to the best of our knowledge data on access to
water is not available at the national level to the same extent that data on land
ownership distribution is; hence, even though we understand the importance of the
issue of access to water, we do not present detailed data on this in the paper. We
hope that this issue will be explored in future research.
We do not think that productivity differentials between irrigated and non-irrigated
areas make state-level analysis useless. The appropriate level of analysis depends
on the questions that the analysis is meant to address. Our aim in this study is to
understand the broad patterns of evolution of the relations of production that the
majority of the working population in India labours in; that is why we have
undertaken the analysis at the aggregate, national and state level. We are aware of
the fact that this necessarily forces us to ignore several important variations, like
the extent of irrigation, observable at lower levels of aggregation; every aggregate
level study would face this limitation. A more disaggregated analysis is something
we might take up in the future to complement our present study; but we believe
that this does not detract from the usefulness of aggregate-level studies which can
inform national-level political strategy and action.

C. INTER-STATE VARIATION IN LANDHOLDING PATTERNS
To make sense of the geographical variation in the patterns of land ownership
across Indian states, we have divided all the states into two groups. The first group
comprises of states which have a relatively large share of the total area owned by
large landholding families; we call these the “large landholding states” and
summarize information about these states in Table A3. The second group consists of
states where large landholding families own a relatively small proportion of the total
area; we call these the “small landholding states” and provide data about these
states in Table A4. As expected, the following states belong to the first group:
Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Punjab, and Rajasthan. The second group, i.e., the small landholding group has the
following members: Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala,
Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.

12

Why is this division into what we call large landholding and small landholding states
useful? Anecdotal and other evidence that we present later on in the paper
suggests that the first group of states, i.e., the large landholding states, is precisely
the group that has witnessed relatively robust growth of capitalist relations of
production in agriculture;4 the second group largely consists of the states which are
still encumbered by remnants of pre-capitalist modes of organizing production. The
fact that the latter group of states has also seen a decline in the share of land
owned by large landholding families seems to suggest that the economic position of
the “semi-feudal” landlords, to the extent they derive their power solely from land
ownership, has declined relative to the middle and rich farmers and capitalist
landlords at the national, state and regional level. The semi-feudal landlords seem
to have been replaced by rich and middle peasants as the ruling bloc in the agrarian
structure of contemporary India. This, as we point out later, was not so much the
result of political conflict between a rising capitalist farming class and the feudal
oligarchy; rather, the latter have, aided by a pliant State, gradually transformed
themselves into capitalist farmers, among other things. We return to this important
point later in the concluding section.

D. LANDLESSNESS
Since land is one of the most important “means of production” in the agrarian
economy, any analysis of the pattern of land ownership in the rural economy must
pay close attention to the group of landless households. Since this group of
households is totally divorced from ownership of land, they might be expected to
give us an accurate measure of what we might call a rural proletariat class, the
class of rural population who are effectively propertyless.
According to National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) data summarized in
Table A5, the extent of landlessness has stayed more or less constant over the last
five decades: in 1960-61, 11.7% of rural households were landless; the
corresponding figure in the 2002-03 survey came out to 10%. The inter-state
variation in landlessness shows that Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka
have the largest share of landless households in rural areas. On the lower side,
Jammu & Kashmir, Kerala, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have
small shares of landless households in the rural economy.

The fact that states like Punjab and Haryana have undergone robust capitalist growth has
been widely noted and commented on. Evidence that points in this direction are: relative
consolidation of agricultural holdings, increased mechanization of the production process,
predominance of peasant-proprietors as opposed to parasitic landlords, radical change in
the pattern of tenancy (on which more below), accumulation of capital in the agricultural
sector, etc. For evidence on the growth of capitalist relations in Punjab agriculture see,
Sidhu, (2005) and the references therein.
4
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The NSSO definition of landless households is, we feel, misleading and gives a
tremendous underestimate of landlessness in rural India. This is because the NSSO
defines landless households as only those households which own less than 0.02
hectares. Though the NSSO has consistently used this definition to define landless
households, this gives an incorrect picture of “effective landlessness”. This becomes
clear once we juxtapose land ownership data with data on patterns of land use.
Data put out by the NSSO for 2002-03 show that households owning less than 0.4
hectares use more than 90% of their land as homestead (Government of India,
2006a, pp. 25). Thus, if landlessness is understood as pertaining to land that can be
used for cultivation and that can generate some income for the family, then all
households owning less than 0.4 hectares should be considered landless. Hence, a
more realistic definition of landlessness must consider all households owning less
than 0.4 hectares as “effectively landless”.
Using this definition of landlessness, we see that the extent of effective
landlessness is both more pronounced and that it has significantly increased over
the decades, as shown in Table A5 and depicted in Chart 6. The proportion of
effectively landless households, according to this definition, increased from 44.21%
in 1960-61 to 60.15% in 2002-03 for the country as a whole, an appreciable
increase by all accounts. Since land is the primary input to agricultural production,
this also underscores the highly skewed distribution of landholding patterns in India
even today: 60 percent of the poorest rural households own only 6 percent of the
land used for cultivation! The fact that the majority of rural households are
effectively landless is also corroborated by looking at the estimate of households
that own no land apart from homestead (Table 4R, Government of India, 2006a) as
summarized in Table 5.
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Table 5: Proportion of Rural Households
Homestead
Andhra Pradesh
53.1 Jharkhand
Arunachal Pradesh
23.5 Karnataka
Assam
40.3 Kerala
Madhya
Bihar
43.7 Pradesh
Chhattisgarh
26.2 Maharashtra
Gujarat
44.0 Manipur

with no land other than
24.7
40.4
68.3

Orissa
Punjab
Rajasthan

38.5
56.8
19.6

34.0
44.8
30.3

Sikkim
44.4
Tamil Nadu
64.5
Tripura
59.5
Uttar
Haryana
49.5 Meghalaya
29.0 Pradesh
26.3
Himachal
22.7 Mizoram
14.1 Uttaranchal
27.7
West BenJammu and Kashmir 11.0 Nagaland
15.5 gal
46.5
th
Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59 Round, January-December, 2003.
Along expected lines, increasing landlessness is reflected in the increasing
proportion of agricultural workers vis-à-vis cultivators in rural India. Apart from a
few outlier states like Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, J&K, and
Rajasthan, most other Indian states in 2001 had substantial numbers of agricultural
workers compared to cultivators (details in Table A6). Some major states like
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal had more
agricultural workers than cultivators. The evolution of the relative strength of
cultivators and agricultural workers in recent decades is also interesting. For the
country as a whole, while the number of cultivators remained more or less constant
at 125 million between 1991 and 2001, the number of agricultural workers
increased from about 86 million to 106 million during this same time period (Mishra,
2007); increasing landlessness created the grounds for the swelling of the ranks of
the rural proletariat.

E. TENANCY
Growing landlessness might not lead to the consolidation of capitalist relations of
production and growth of the rural proletariat and semi-proletariat if there is
widespread prevalence of tenant cultivation. There are after all, two different ways
in which the surplus labour of direct producers can be appropriated by the ruling
classes in a rural context, directly as wage-labour and indirectly as land rent, with
the latter referring to the rent paid as part of a tenancy contract. The first method
of appropriating surplus is associated with capitalist relations of production, while
the second is associated with semi-feudal methods of surplus extraction.
Tenant cultivation, with sharecropping as the form of the tenancy contract,
especially allows extraction of the surplus product in the form of land rent.
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Therefore, sharecropping tenant cultivation has been historically identified as one of
the most important semi-feudal forms of surplus extraction in rural India. It is for
this reason that the extent of its prevalence today can be used as an important
indicator of the continued strength of feudal and semi-feudal modes of surplus
extraction, and indirectly at the relative strength of the landed gentry in rural
society. Hence, it is important to complement the study of land ownership and
landlessness patterns with a close study of the evolution of tenancy, both the
extent of its prevalence and the evolution of its form, over time. What does the
evidence on tenancy show?
Aggregate level data suggests that tenant cultivation as a form of organizing
agricultural production has witnessed a steady and steep decline in rural India over
the last four decades. According to NSSO data, the percentage of households
leasing in land has declined from 25% in 1971-72 to 12% in 2003; the percentage of
area leased in to total area owned has declined from 12% in 1971-72 to 7% in 2003;
and the percentage of area leased out to total area owned has also decreased from
6% in 1971-72 to 3% in 2003 (Government of India, 2006a). The same declining
pattern is observed even with data on tenancy from the various Agricultural
Censuses in India.
The sharp decline in the extent of tenancy is also observed for operational holdings.
Whereas the percentage of operational holdings with partly or wholly owned land
has practically remained unchanged at around 95%, the percentage of operational
holdings with partly or wholly leased-in land has fallen drastically from around 24%
in 1960-61 to 10% in 2002-03. In terms of the total area operated, the percentage
share of area leased in has declined from 10.7% in 1960-61 to 6.5% in 2002-03. At
the aggregate level, the gradual shift from tenant cultivation to self-cultivation
seems to be a persistent and unmistakable trend in the Indian agrarian economy.
It is true that aggregate figures about the decline of the extent of tenancy might not
be very helpful in drawing conclusions about the “tenancy problem”. For it is
conceivable that the decline in tenancy is largely restricted to larger holdings, i.e.,
those belonging to middle and rich peasants, while there is a simultaneous increase
in the incidence of tenancy for smaller holdings, i.e., those belonging to poor
peasants and landless labourers (Patnaik, 1976). Since, in any meaningful sense,
the “tenancy problem” refers to the indirect extraction of surplus labour of the
landless and near-landless households, we need to supplement the aggregate
picture about the evolution of tenancy with a more disaggregated story, where the
disaggregation runs along size-classes.
What is the evidence on the evolution of tenancy by size-classes? As shown in
Chart 4 (details in Table A7) , other than for large operational holdings, i.e.,
operational holdings of 10 hectares or more, the share of tenant holdings have
declined sharply in all the other categories. In fact, the share of tenant cultivation
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has marginally increased for large operational holdings over the last five decades
(though there is a decline over the last decade even for this category).

As shown in Table 6, the share of area leased in by size-class of operational
holdings display the same pattern across the size-class categories; the share of area
leased in has declined across the board, with the decline sharpest for the medium
holdings. For large operational holdings, the share of leased in land declined by the
least proportional amount. If, as mentioned earlier, the tenancy problem largely
refers to semi-feudal modes of exploitation of the landless and near-landless
through tenant cultivation, then this problem seems to have become less severe
over the last five decades. What about the geographical variation in the extent of
tenancy?

Table 6: Share of Area Leased In by Operational SizeClass
Percentage of area leased in
1960197019811991200261
71
82
92
03
Marginal
16.6
18.9
9.7
8.7
8.6
Small
14
14.6
8.5
8.5
6.8
Semi-medium
11.7
11.7
7.3
7.4
6.3
Medium
9.6
8.7
6.6
6.9
4.2
Large
8.3
5.9
5.3
11.4
6.1
All sizes
10.7
10.6
7.2
8.3
6.5
th
Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59 Round, January-December, 2003.
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The inter-State variation in the extent of tenancy in 2003 shows an interesting
pattern too, as summarized in Table A8. The states which report the highest share
of leased-in area are Punjab and Haryana, the two states which have the most
“developed” agricultural production. Apart from Orissa, Punjab and Haryana, all the
other major states had leased-in area which was less than 10% of the total operated
area. Thus, states which are usually considered to be the bastions of semi-feudal
and pre-capitalist production relations are not the ones which have the highest
prevalence of tenancy, with the exception of Orissa; it seems, therefore, that the
development of capitalism in Indian agriculture has peculiarly used tenancy and
other forms of pre-capitalist relations of production as means of reducing the costs
of production and controlling labour.
To get a complete picture of the extent and effect of tenancy, we need to include
data on the terms of tenancy too, i.e., how the tenancy contract was specified. The
NSSO landholding surveys classify contracts relating to leased-in land into the
following categories: (a) fixed money lease, (b) fixed produce lease, (c) share of
produce lease, (d) service contract lease, (e) share of produce along with other
terms, (f) leased from relatives. The NSSO data shows that the predominant form of
tenancy has been sharecropping, i.e., the share of produce lease. This has not
changed much over time: the share of leased-in area going for sharecropping has
stayed relatively stable around 40%, as can be seen from Chart 5 (see Table A9 for
details).

The inter-state variation in the terms of lease, (see in Table A10), also provides
useful information. Haryana and Punjab, the states with the largest share of leasedin land, had fixed money lease contracts as the predominant form of tenancy.
Assam, Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh were the four major states which had
sharecropping as the predominant form of tenancy contract. This difference is
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important because the form of tenancy is radically different in the two groups of
states.
In states like Punjab and Haryana, tenant cultivators are no longer the landless and
poor peasants; it is rather the middle and rich peasants who lease-in land to
increase the size of their agricultural operations and reap some economies of scale
on their capital investments (Sidhu, 2005). Thus, the fixed money rent form of
tenancy is not an indicator of pre-capitalist relations of production, but are rather
very much part of the capitalist development in Indian agriculture; the land rent
that is earned by the lessor, in this case, can be considered capitalist rent. In states
like Bihar and Orissa, on the other hand, tenancy is still predominantly of the old
form, where the largest group of lesse is landless and near-landless peasants. In
such a scenario, sharecropping operates as a semi-feudal mode of surplus
extraction, where land rent can be considered pre-capitalist rent. 5
The aggregate evidence on tenancy, thus, seems to suggest a sharply declining role
of tenancy at the national level. What is interesting is that its continued prevalence
is observed mainly in contexts of capitalist agricultural production, where
sharecropping is less important than money rents, and not in the states with semifeudal modes of surplus extraction; among the three states with the largest
reported share of tenant cultivation, the top two are Punjab and Haryana, precisely
the states where capitalist farming has developed the most. In the more precapitalist settings, tenancy is relatively less prevalent today and has steadily
declined over the decades but, along expected lines, sharecropping continues to be
the predominant form of the tenancy contract.
A caveat is in order. It is well known that reliable data on the real extent and terms
of tenancy is difficult to come by. Due to the possibility of legal action securing the
rights of tenants, there is always an incentive for landlords to understate the extent
of tenancy they actually participate in. Often times, this is done by replacing
recorded tenants with unrecorded tenants; if the extent of unrecorded tenant
relationships are large, then official data on the extent of tenancy would
underestimate their true prevalence. It is difficult to rule out the possibility that the
NSSO data on tenancy suffers from such problems. What might mitigate the
problem is the fact that we have looked at data on tenancy over several decades
and not only at a point in time; hence, if the prevalence of unrecorded tenancies
have remained more or less stable over time, we might get a relatively correct
picture of the trend.

5

For a distinction between capitalist and pre-capitalist rent see Patnaik (1976).
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F. RETURNS FROM CULTIVATION AND SOURCES OF INCOME
While information on patterns of land ownership, landlessness and tenancy provide
very useful clues about the agrarian structure of India, this needs to be
complemented with data on the sources of rural income to get a more complete
picture of class relations. How does the vast majority earn their incomes? Do they
work mainly for wages or do they derive the lion’s share of their income from self or
tenant cultivation? Do they derive a substantial portion of their income from petty
production? These are important questions to consider because they provide clues
about the necessary relations into which the majority of the rural population enter
during the process of production and income generation. A predominance of wage
income would suggest the gradual spread of the institution of wage-labour and
therefore of capitalist relations; continued dependence on income from cultivation
(self or tenant) would suggest an opposite story.
Several caveats are in order before we proceed. First, a straightforward link
between wage-labor and capitalism on the one hand, and non-wage income and
non-capitalism on the other hand has its pitfalls. As we see in the section on
industry, various types of self-employment income can result from merchant and
finance capitalist relations (mainly variations on the putting-out system); hence
non-wage income can often mask the underlying capitalist relations. Similarly, wage
income can often mask the fact of bondage, extra-economic coercion and other
forms of “unfree” labour restricting the domain of operation of capitalist relations;
but, as has been pointed out, for instance by Patnaik (1976), many of these
“unfree” relations are created by capitalism and are not relics of a pre-capitalist
past and so cannot be taken as a marker of semi-feudalism. Second, often the same
individual participates in several types of economic activities, as we mention below,
and thus the aggregate level distinctions that we make between wage and nonwage income might need serious modifications when looking at more micro-level
phenomena. Thus, with these caveats in mind, we will proceed to study the sources
of rural income because we feel the aggregate level distinction between wage and
non-wage income still has important clues to offer about the dominant relations of
production in India.
To start an analysis of the sources of rural income we need to revisit the issue,
pointed out earlier, of the continued fragmentation of land. Continuing
fragmentation leads to a declining average size of ownership and operational
holdings, and this increasingly brings the question of viability of small-holding
cultivation to the fore. Of course the small size of the average holding is not the
only factor that needs to be reckoned with when looking at the issue of viability of
small-scale cultivation. Existence of the ground-rent barrier (Patnaik, 1986), lack of
formal credit, movement in the terms of trade vis-à-vis industry and services,
dwindling rural public investment and rapidly eroding irrigation facilities kick in too,
and makes technological change almost impossible to initiate and sustain at the
farm level; the exploitation faced by farmers in the input and output markets,
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combined with these other factors, force incomes from small holdings to be
extremely low. For instance, in 2002-03, the average return from cultivation per
hectare, i.e., value of output less value of paid out expenses (excluding value of
family labour or rent of owned land), was Rs. 6756 for Kharif and Rs. 9290 for the
Rabi season (Mishra, 2007). The low return from cultivation, as summarized in Table
7, implies that most rural families need to augment their incomes through wage
labour (in both the rural farm and non-farm sectors) and petty commodity
production (of both agricultural and non-agricultural commodities). The dependence
on wage income and income from petty production would seem to be especially
pronounced for the small farmers, marginal farmers and near landless households,
which together comprise about 85% of the rural population. Along expected lines,
this is exactly what we find when we look at the sources of income of rural
households from NSSO data.
Tables 8 and 9 summarize information about the sources of rural income by the
size-class of ownership holdings. Several interesting facts emerge from this data.
First, most of the rural households have abysmally low incomes; the incomes do not
cover even the basic expenditures necessary for survival. It is only the rural families
with more than 4 hectares of land whose total income exceeds their expenditures
(Government of India, 2005; Mishra, 2007). To put this in perspective, let us recall
that in 2003, 96% of rural households owned less than 4 hectares; thus, in 2003,
96% of rural households had lower total incomes – which includes income from
cultivation, wage labour, and petty production – than even what their extremely low
expenditures required. It is, therefore, not surprising that rural India should have
seen an explosion of debt over the last decade, leading in many cases to severe
distress and even suicides. Second, for a large majority of rural households, the
primary source of income is wage income, as can be seen from Chart 7. For all
families with less than 0.4 hectares, i.e., the effectively landless households as
defined above, wage income provided more than half of their total monthly income;
in 2003, let us recall that 60% of rural households belonged to this category. For
completely landless households, of course, this proportion would be much higher.
Third, income from petty commodity production accounts for a substantial portion –
close to 20 percent – of the total income of rural households; this is especially true
for near landless and marginal farmer households, who together comprised about
80% of rural households in 2003.
Thus aggregate level data seems to suggest that wage income has become a very
important source of income for the majority of the rural population. This implies that
surplus extraction through the institution of wage-labour has become one of the
most important forms of extracting the surplus product of direct producers. Since
income from petty commodity production is an important source of income for the
landless labourers and marginal farmers, this suggests that exploitation by
merchant capital through unequal exchange is also an important form of surplus
extraction.
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Table 7: Returns from Cultivation, 2003
returns
returns
returns
from
from
returns
from
farm ani- non-farm
% of
from
rabi (Rs
mals (Rs business
housekharif (Rs per
per
(Rs per
holds
per year) year)
month)
month)
Near landless
9.9
Marginal
55.6
Small
18.1
SemiMedium
10.6
Medium
4.8
Large
0.9
All
Source: Mishra, 2007.

Average
Family
Size

367
3243
8098

462
2667
5922

125
88
100

339
223
181

5
5.2
5.7

13880
22841
33494
6200

10596
20940
34600
5059

69
75
122
85

188
422
507
236

6.2
6.9
7.5
5.5

To preempt any misunderstanding, the notion of unequal exchange and its
relationship to surplus extraction needs some elaboration. As long as commodities
exchange in proportion to their values, i.e., as long as prices reflect the underlying
labour values congealed in commodities, artisanal producers cannot be exploited, in
the Marxist sense of the term, because they are not separated from the means of
production. But the formation of market prices is mediated through monopoly and
other forms of bargaining power; hence, market prices for individual and groups of
commodities can, in the presence of monopoly, deviate from the their labour
values. If one party to the exchange can systematically ensure this deviation, this is
tantamount to systematic unequal exchange, i.e., exchange which systematically
deviates from the labour values congealed in commodities. In such a situation, one
party to the exchange appropriates part of the value that is produced by the other
party, and thereby appropriates a part of the surplus labour time of the other party
without giving anything in return. The markets where the commodities arising from
petty production by landless and marginal farmers are sold are typically controlled
by merchants; these merchants manage to systematically ensure deviation of
prices (they pay to the artisan-producers) from underlying labour values due to their
monopoly position in these markets. This is the sense in which merchant capital
manages to appropriate a part of the value produced by petty producers through
unequal exchange.

G. CREDIT
Informal credit, often linked with product and labour markets, has historically
played a very important role in the perpetuation of semi-servile conditions of life
and economic stagnation in rural India. Since usurious capital, which operates
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through the mechanism of informal credit, is never directly involved in the process
of production in the sense in which industrial capital is, the profits of the
moneylender can only be understood as a claim on the surplus product produced
elsewhere. Usurious capital, therefore, gets a share of the total surplus production
through the process of redistribution of the surplus without having participated in its
generation. That is the sense in which usurious capital is understood to be
necessarily parasitic.
Table 8: Sources of Average
inincome
come
wage
from
from
incultivaanicome
tion
mals

Monthly Income (Rs)
income
from
nonfarm
business

<
0.01
1075
11
64
0.010.4
973
296
94
0.41-1
720
784
112
1.01-2
635
1578
102
2.01-4
637
2685
57
4.0110
486
4676
12
>10.0
0
557
8321
113
Source: Table 6, Report No. 497, NSS 59th

total
income

total
expenses

230

1380

2297

270
193
178
210

1633
1809
2493
3589

2390
2672
3148
3685

507

5681

4626

9667

6418

676
Round.

Table 9: Percentage of Average Monthly
Income (%)
income
infrom
come
nonwage
income
from
farm
infrom culanibusicome
tivation
mals
ness
< 0.01 77.90
0.80
4.64
16.67
0.010.4
59.58
18.13
5.76
16.53
0.41-1
39.80
43.34
6.19
10.67
1.01-2
25.47
63.30
4.09
7.14
2.01-4
17.75
74.81
1.59
5.85
4.0110
8.55
82.31
0.21
8.92
>10.0
0
5.76
86.08
1.17
6.99
th
Source: Table 6, Report No. 497, NSS 59 Round.
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During the “mode of production” debate, usurious capital and debt bondage played
a key role in defining “semi-feudalism”, which was understood as a semi-servile
state of existence for the working population in the agrarian economy. Low
production by tenant cultivators necessitated consumption loans; often these loans
were made by the same landlord who had hired out land to the tenant. The terms of
these loans were so onerous that they could never be possibly paid back by the
tenant; as interest kept piling up on top of the original loan amount, the tenants
were eventually forced to “pay back” in labour services rendered to the landlord.
Thus, this mechanism of perpetual debt bondage drastically reduced the freedom of
labour to participate in the institution of wage-labour and created the semi-servile
conditions identified as “semi-feudalism” (Prasad, 1974). Note that in such a
situation, a large part of the surplus product of the direct producers was
appropriated as feudal “labour services”.
Equally important, informal credit was often the mechanism through which different
markets, like the labour market and the product markets, were linked together. This
interlinked system of markets then facilitates extraction of surplus through unequal
exchange, in the sense we have used this term above. Interest rates in these
“informal” credit markets are often as high as 30% per month and the main
borrowers are the landless labourers, the marginal and small peasant households
whose total income is perennially below their consumption expenditures. Existence
of usurious capital also acts as a depressant on the rural economy: very high rates
of return promised by money-lending activities create enormous disincentives for
productive investment, thereby perpetuating conditions of economic stagnation and
social backwardness. Furthermore, production relations are themselves important in
shaping these unequal exchange relations. It is precisely the size of land holdings
and absence of sufficient collateral due to maldistribution of assets, that forces
peasants to go to informal credit sources and as a result to self-exploit themselves.
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Hence, for all these reasons, it is important to study the evolution of informal credit
in the rural economy of India. What does the evidence say?
While the share of total rural credit provided by moneylenders declined
substantially between 1961 and 1981, the trend of rapid decline was halted in the
early 1980s. Since then the moneylender has made a spectacular comeback in rural
India, as can be seen in Chart 8 (details in Table A11). The new moneylenders,
though, are quite different, in terms of social composition, from the older
moneylenders. While the earlier brand of moneylenders had close links with landed
property, the new crop does not seem to have that connection. Over the last two
decades, various groups of the rural population, like traders, school teachers,
government servants, lawyers, rich farmers, and other members of the petty
bourgeois class, have entered this lucrative business, facilitated by the gradual but
steady retreat of formal credit institutions.

The inter-state variation of the prevalence of informal credit, as depicted in Chart 9,
has interesting features. First, most of the larger states have a larger share of the
total rural credit coming from formal than from informal sources; other than Punjab,
Rajasthan, Assam, Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, all the other states had a higher
proportion of total credit attributable to formal than to informal sources in 2003.
Since the largest component of informal credit comes from moneylenders, most
states seem to have had relatively lower prevalence of moneylenders. Second,
some of the states with relatively well developed capitalist agriculture like Punjab,
Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu also have a very high prevalence of informal credit.
In Punjab, for instance, one of the main players in the informal credit market is the
trader-middleman known as the arhatiya, who often provides credit, sells inputs and
also procures the output from the farmer. This typical pattern of interlinked markets
allows the surplus product to be easily extracted from the direct producer through
unequal exchange whereby input prices are inflated and output prices depressed.
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Interestingly, West Bengal, which has had some limited degree of land reforms in
the past, also shows a high percentage of non-institutional forms of rural credit.

H. CAPITAL FORMATION IN AGRICULTURE
An important question relating to the development of capitalist relations of
production in Indian agriculture is whether there has been any significant trend
towards reinvestment of surplus and capital accumulation in the agrarian economy.
This is an important question because the development of capitalist relations
cannot conceivably preclude capital formation on a more or less extensive scale.
Lack of capital formation in agriculture would indicate the continued presence of
production relations which act towards hindering the development of productive
forces. Hence, it is important to take a look at the evidence on the trends of capital
accumulation in the agrarian economy. What does the aggregate level data suggest
in this regard?
Aggregate level data on gross capital formation in Indian agriculture shows
interesting temporal patterns, as displayed in Chart 10 (details in Table A12). To
begin with, note that gross fixed capital formation in agriculture, forestry and
fisheries (GCFA) is composed of two parts: gross fixed capital formation in
agriculture (GFCFA) and changes in stocks (CIS). As can be seen from Chart 10, the
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gross value of capital stocks has more than tripled in real terms (1993-94 prices)
over the last four decades, moving from 63 billion rupees in 1961 to 190 billion
rupees in 1999; this growth, moreover, has been largely driven by the growth in
fixed capital formation.

For the period as a whole, i.e., from 1961 to 1999, gross capital formation in
agriculture grew at about 3% per annum, a significant rate of growth by developing
country standards. Decomposed by decades, the growth in gross capital formation
displays significant differences. While the growth rate of GCFA was 5.05% per
annum in the decade of the 1960s, it accelerated significantly to 8.7% per annum
during the 1970s; thereafter, the growth rate slowed down significantly. During the
1980s, capital formation registered a negative growth rate of -0.33% per annum
and picked up again in the 1990s to a growth rate of 2.89% per annum during the
1990s. What is interesting is that the slowdown in capital formation is largely
accounted for by the deceleration of public sector capital expenditures in
agriculture; private sector investments, though growing at a slower rate than in the
1960s and 1970s, never became negative even as public sector investment growth
dipped below zero; moreover, it has picked up steam during the 1990s despite poor
performance of the public sector (Table 1.2, Gulati and Bathla, 2002).
How does this growth in capital accumulation in the agricultural sector compare
with the rest of the Indian economy? To answer this question, we look at the gross
capital formation in agriculture relative to the aggregate gross domestic capital
formation (GDCF) in the Indian economy; this information is depicted in Chart 11
(details in Table A13). As can be seen from Chart 11, agriculture’s share in the gross
domestic capital formation was stable at around 15% till the early 1980s; in fact it
even displayed a slight positive trend from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s.
Thereafter, capital formation in agriculture has declined drastically as a share of the
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total capital formation in the economy, from about 18 % in 1980 to a little more
than 6% in 1999.

Aggregate level data on capital formation in Indian agriculture, therefore, seem to
suggest that there was significant capital accumulation during the 1970s and
1980s. During this period, capital formation in agriculture kept pace with capital
formation in the rest of the Indian economy. From the decade of the 1980s, driven
largely by changes in central government policy, agriculture has faced a state of
relative neglect: capital formation in agriculture has not only significantly slowed
down but has also fallen relative to the rest of the economy. This can be accounted
for by the drastic fall in public investment in agriculture.

I. AGGREGATE TRENDS AND SUMMARY
Our analysis of aggregate level data has revealed the following significant trends in
the agrarian economy of India:
1. The share of GDP contributed by agriculture has steadily declined over the
last five decades; this decline has not been matched by a decline in the share
of the workforce engaged in agriculture. The result of these two trends has
been a declining share of per capita value added from the agricultural sector.
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This has essentially consigned a large section of the Indian working
population to very low productivity (and low income) work.
2. The average size of agricultural holdings, both ownership and operational,
has seen a steady decline over the last five decades, with the average
ownership holding in 2002-03 being 0.73 hectares.
3. The ownership of land remains as skewed as it was five decades ago; several
measures capture this skewed pattern of ownership in the agrarian economy.
For instance, the Gini coefficient of landholding ownership concentration has
remained practically unchanged between 1960-61 and 2002-03; in fact it has
marginally increased between 1991-92 and 2002-03.
4.

While the aggregate distribution of land ownership remains as skewed as
before, interesting and important patterns are visible within this unchanging
aggregate picture. The share of land owned by large (10 ha or more) and
medium (4 ha to 10 ha) landholding families has steadily declined over the
last few decades from around 60% to 34%; the share owned by small (1 ha to
2 ha) and marginal (less than 1 ha) landholding families has increased from
around 21% to 43%, while the share of semi-medium (2 ha to 4 ha) families
has remained unchanged at around 20%.

5. Parallel to this decline in the share of land held by large landholding families
is their decline as a share of rural households; on the other hand, there is a
large increase in the share of small and marginal landholding families among
rural households. In 2002-03, 80% of rural households were marginal
landholding families; the corresponding figure was 66% in 1960-61. Both
these trends seem to indicate the declining economic, social and political
power derived from the ownership of land in India.
6. The geographical (inter-state) variation of landholding ownership pattern
allows us to divide the Indian states into two groups: large landholding states,
and small landholding states. In the “large” landholding states, a substantial
share of total area is still owned by relatively large landholding families; in
the “small” landholding states, the share of land held by large or medium
landholding families is very small. The former group consists of: Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab,
Rajasthan; the second group consists of: Assam, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh,
J&K, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal.
7. Going hand-in-hand with the decline in the share of land owned by large
landowning families, is the steady decline of tenant cultivation and its
gradual replacement by self cultivation in Indian agriculture. The share of
operational holdings using tenant cultivation declined from about 24% in
1960-61 to about 10% in 2002-03. There are large geographical variations in
the extent of tenancy, with the largest share of leased-in land as a share of
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total operated area occurring in Punjab and Haryana, two prominent
examples of what we have called large landholding states; Orissa has high
prevalence of tenancy and is an example of what we have called small
landholding states. The proportion of area owned and the proportion of area
operated by the different size-classes are almost equal; hence, there is no
evidence of reverse tenancy on any substantial scale at the aggregate level,
though this might hide reverse tenancy at state or regional levels.
8. In most places where tenancy exists, the largest form of the tenancy contract
is still sharecropping. In 2002-03, share cropping accounted for about 40% of
the land under tenancy in India; this has more or less stayed constant over
the decades. An important exception is Punjab and Haryana, the two states
which have the largest share of leased-in land, where the predominant form
of the tenancy contract is for fixed monetary payment.
9. Effective landlessness is large and has steadily increased over the past few
decades. The share of effectively landless households in total rural
households has increased from about 44% in 1960-61 to 60% in 2002-03.
10.Small holding agricultural production has increasingly become economically
unviable over the years. In 2003, the average income from cultivation was
insufficient to cover even the very low level of consumption expenditures of
the majority of rural households. This is one of the primary causes behind the
recent increase in rural indebtedness. This increasing difficulty of sustaining
incomes through cultivation was probably what led close to 40% of farmers in
2005 to suggest, during the course of a NSSO Survey, that given a chance,
they would opt out of agriculture. Changes in the agrarian structure of India
seem to have already brought the question of collectivization on the historical
agenda. We return to this point in the conclusion.
11. Disaggregating total incomes of rural households engaged in agriculture
according to types of income show that wage income has become the main
source of income for a large majority of the population. For about 60% of the
rural households in 2003, the major share of income came from wage work,
supplemented by income coming from petty commodity production, both in
the agricultural and non-agricultural sector. Another 20% of rural households
drew equal shares of their total income from wage work and cultivation, both
at about 40%.
12.Prevalence of informal sources of credit through moneylenders had seen a
sharp decline over the 1960s and 1970s, but the decline seems to have been
halted since the early 1980s. The moneylender has made a comeback in rural
India, facilitated by a steady retreat of the institutions of formal credit.
13.There was significant capital accumulation in the agricultural sector during
the 1970s and 1980s; this has drastically fallen during the 1980s and has
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picked up a little during the 1990s. The fall in the growth rate of capital
formation has been largely driven by the fall in public sector investments in
the agrarian economy.
Putting all these trends together, one is led to the following tentative conclusions
(more in the nature of a working hypothesis): over the past few decades, the
relations of production in the Indian agrarian economy have become increasingly
“capitalist”; this conclusion emerges from the fact that the predominant mode of
surplus extraction seems to be working through the institution of wage-labour, the
defining feature of capitalism. Articulated to the global capitalist-imperialist system,
the development of capitalism in the periphery has of course not led to the growth
of income and living standards of the vast majority of the population. On the
contrary, the agrarian economy has continued to stagnate and the majority of the
rural population has been consigned to a life of poverty and misery.
Aggregate level data suggests that the two main forms through which the surplus
product of direct producers is extracted are (a) surplus value through the institution
of wage-labour (which rests on equal exchange), and (b) surplus value through
unequal exchange (which mainly affects petty producers) where input prices are
inflated and output prices deflated for the direct producers due to the presence of
monopoly, monopsony and interlinking of markets; semi-feudal forms of surplus
product extraction, through the institution of tenant cultivation and share cropping,
has declined over time. Merchant and usurious capital continues to maintain a
substantial presence in the life of the rural populace, both of which manage to
appropriate a part of the surplus value created through wage-labour, apart from
directly extracting surplus value from petty producers through unequal exchange.
The process of class differentiation has been considerably slowed down and
complicated due to the steady incorporation of the Indian economy into the global
capitalist system, which has supported and even encouraged the growth of a large
“informal” production sector. This informal production sector can be best
understood as being involved in petty commodity production, both of agricultural
and nonagricultural commodities. Petty commodity production refers to the
organization of production where the producer owns the means of production and
primarily uses family and other forms of non-wage labour in the production process.
Petty commodity production is exploited mainly by merchant and usurious capital
where the main form of surplus extraction is through the mechanism of unequal
exchange and not through the institution of wage-labour; unequal exchange is often
facilitated and maintained through interlinked product, labour and credit markets.
The coexistence of both wage-labour and petty commodity production, whereby
landless labourers, marginal farmers and small farmers participate in both, in one
as free labour and in the other as owner-producer, has impeded the development of
proletarian class consciousness and complicated the task of revolutionary politics.
This is a point we return to in the concluding section but before that we turn to a
detailed study of petty commodity production in the non-agricultural sector.
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PART II: INDUSTRY6
A. INTRODUCTION
After three decades of planned industrialization and another three decades of
increasingly market-based development, what types of production relations are
found in Indian manufacturing? What are the main modes of surplus extraction? Is
Indian industry capitalist? If so what is the nature of this capitalism? Is it dominated
by industrial, finance or merchant capital? To address these questions, we present
macroeconomic data from five rounds of the National Sample Surveys (NSS) of the
unorganized manufacturing sector from 1984 to the present, supplemented with
micro case studies.
Traditional accounts of Indian industry tended to focus on large-scale or “modern”
industry, since it was assumed that this sector would grow rapidly to accommodate
all industrial employment. The working class was also imagined similarly as
consisting of urban workers in large industry. The workers and small producers in
the “traditional” or small-scale industry, though numerically strong, occupied an
ambiguous position in Marxist theory for two reasons: one, the revolutionary subject
was the modern large-scale industrial working class, and two, the revolutionary
experiences of Russia and China showed that peasants and other small producers
could, depending on the specific historical conditions, be reactionary forces, allies
of the modern industrial working class, or a revolutionary force in their own right.
The present study is motivated by a desire to understand the material conditions
confronting the vast majority of the industrial working class, which labors in the
“informal sector.” Large-scale industry has not expanded as expected in India. The
share of large industry (factories of >100 workers) in manufacturing employment
grew from around 5% in 1900 to 30% in 1980 and thereafter has declined to around
25 % (Roy 2000). While low employment elasticity in large-scale industry has been
blamed on imported capital-intensive technologies, the other less emphasized part
of the story is extensive use of informal (casual and sub-contracted) employment by
formal firms particularly for labor-intensive work, particularly in the post-1991
period. This once again points to the necessity of acquiring a good grasp of the
empirical realities of India’s informal manufacturing workforce.
To a first approximation, relations of production in large formal sector firms may be
termed “industrial capitalist.” We do not discuss these further. This study limits
itself to the informal sector. According to the latest National Sample Survey
Organization (NSSO) survey covering the period 2005-2006, 36.44 million of India’s
45 million industrial workers (i.e. about 75%) were employed in the informal
manufacturing sector (Government of India, 2008a). The informal economy
accounts for 40% of industrial GDP. Here relations of production and modes of
6

In this study we use the term “Industry” to refer only to the manufacturing sector and exclude mining and construction from our analysis.
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surplus extraction are more complex than those prevailing in formal industry.
However it is imperative to develop a theoretical understanding of these relations
so that the concept of the “working class” does not continue to ignore the vast
majority of the working population in India.
Across all three sectors, as with most developing countries, in India a large portion
of the employment (by some estimates up to 90%) is classified as “unorganized”
(Govt. of India terminology) or “informal” (academic and general policy usage). An
informal firm is not registered with the government and typically does not pay any
taxes, nor is required to abide by labor and other laws. Informal employment means
that work is not regular, secure, or governed by formal/written contracts, and
usually no benefits (health, retirement, other social security) are paid. Although the
exact size of the informal economy in developing countries is hard to estimate,
there is little disagreement that the vast majority of employment is still outside the
formal sector. Even leaving aside agriculture, the informal sector accounts for 48
percent of non-agricultural employment in North Africa, 51 per cent in Latin
America, 65 per cent in Asia, and 72 per cent in Sub-Saharan Africa.7
This purely statistical or administrative aspect of informality should be distinguished
from more substantive issues of firm size and production and exchange relations,
although naturally the two interact in a complex way (for e.g. costs of conforming to
government regulations are often cited as a reason for remaining small or
undertaking “horizontal” as opposed to “vertical” expansion). Discussions of the
informal sector often conflate multiple closely related yet distinct “axes of
differentiation.” These are shown in Figure 1. In this schematic, the formal-informal
distinction itself is restricted only to the question of State regulation of economic
activity (“registered” versus “unregistered”). For example, for statistical purposes
the Indian manufacturing sector is divided into two parts: those firms that are
registered under the Factories Act of 1948 (“organized manufacturing sector”,
hereafter formal sector) and those that are unregistered because the number of
employees is less than 20 (in official GOI parlance, the “unorganized manufacturing
sector” and hereafter the informal sector). The Annual Survey of Industries (ASI)
collects data on formal firms. The National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO)
includes in its surveys of informal manufacturing all firms which are not covered
under the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) and which are not public sector firms.
This is the universe of informal manufacturing as far as official data is concerned.
Several surveys have been carried out in India since the 1950s at periodic intervals
by the NSSO to estimate the size and contributions to GDP, of the small-scale and
the informal manufacturing sector (both urban and rural).
Other than the formal-informal axis much attention has been focused on the largescale/small-scale (firm size) axis, and informal manufacturing is often equated with
small-scale production. This can be taken to be true as a first approximation with
7

See Jhabvala, Sudarshan and Unni (2003) for a discussion of statistical problems.
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the strong caveat that not all workers employed in the formal sector are “formal
workers” since casual labor employed via contractors and sub-contractors forms a
substantial part of formal sector firms. The ASI collects some data on the casual and
contingent workforce in the formal sector. We do not present this data here. The
point of the schematic is to draw attention to the more substantive aspects of the
formal-informal divide that relate to forms of exploitation (real versus formal
subsumption of labor to capital), relations of production (ownership of means of
production versus wage labor) and the type of circuit of capital (need versus
accumulation).
The share of small-scale and informal industry in employment has been high since
colonial times and NSS data since 1984 shows that informal manufacturing has held
on to its employment share, perhaps even expanded it, in recent times. According
to the most recent NSS round (2005-2006), 85% of firms in informal manufacturing
were own-account enterprises (employing no wage-workers), while 10% were firms
employing less than 6 workers, and 5 % employed more than 6 but less than 20
workers (Government of India, 2008a). The overwhelming number of own-account
firms in informal manufacturing is sometimes celebrated as a type of
“entrepreneurial capitalism.” However this is misleading and elides the fact that
surplus extraction via unequal exchange plays a significant role in this sector.8
Given that informal firms display not only “independent commodity production” and
capitalist relations, but also a large variety of “putting-out” modes as well, we
present a typology to characterize production and exchange relations in the
informal sector. The axes of the typology are “control over capital” (fixed and
working, self or other), “control over labor” (process and product, self or other) and
“control over market” (product and factor, self or other).
For a long time the relations of production and the manner in which surplus is
extracted from the majority of the working class has been neglected or
underemphasized, at times simply being labeled “pre-capitalist,” or “non-capitalist,”
a term which does not tell us much about the actually existing relations. The
informal working class is also not easily recognized as working class from a Marxian
perspective, as it may not be doubly free (either not free of the means of
production, or not freely mobile, or both). NSS data over the past three decades as
well as individual case-studies show that the particular type of capitalism found in
Indian informal manufacturing is characterized by a large number of very small
firms locked in unequal exchange relationships with merchant and finance capital.
Broadly speaking formal rather than real subsumption of labor to capital, and
extraction of absolute rather than relative surplus value characterizes many firms.
Surplus extraction via the “conventional” wage-labor route is compounded by
unequal exchange, unpaid domestic labor, labor bondage, contingent or casual
labor, and gender and caste hierarchies.

8
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Figure 1: The axes of differentiation (MnOP = means of production, Red
line indicates the characteristics usually associated with the formal sector,
the green line, the informal sector)
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B. MARX ON “INFORMAL INDUSTRY”
For the past fifty or sixty years the question of the transition to capitalism has
dogged the development literature, although not always recognized as such. The
problem of replacement of “traditional” pre-capitalist (feudal and petty commodity)
production relations by “modern” capitalist relations was of course the explicit
problem of classical development economics. The same problem later resurfaced in
the context of the “formal-informal” divide and in this form it continues to this day.
Something akin to a sustained and sophisticated debate over the nature of
production relations or the mode of production in agriculture did not occur for Indian
industry, although many of the same issues prevail there as well. Further, many of
the issues that motivated early Marxist controversies over the role of the peasantry
in the socialist revolution are relevant to the analysis of small-scale industrial
production as well.
The question “is Indian agriculture capitalist?” immediately raised the question
“what is capitalism?” The following principle criteria emerged from that debate:
class differentiation and proletarianization of labor, generalized or expanding
commodity production, and surplus accumulation and reinvestment. Then the
question becomes to what extent does doubly-free labor, commodity production
(production for exchange rather than use) and accumulation characterize a certain
sector of the economy, for our purposes Industry. One can safely say that large-
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scale, formal industry displays all these characteristics. However, in the informal
manufacturing sector the story is more complex and these criteria apply in varying
degrees. Generalized commodity production, rather than production for use
dominates, however self-employment exists alongside wage-labor to a significant
degree and data on firm sizes shows that reinvestment of surplus into expanded
reproduction may not occur. Rather the amount of surplus available for
reinvestment may be greatly reduced partly due to low productivity and partly due
to siphoning off of the surplus by merchant and finance capitalists.
Marx had much more to say about the transition from small-scale and cottage
industry to capitalist factory production as compared to the transition from peasant
to capitalist farming. In Chapters 14 and 15 of Capital Vol. 1, he discusses at length
the development of modern industry in England and parts of Germany. The sheer
diversity of production relations, including independent commodity production,
putting-out and wage-labor, described by Marx, calls to mind contemporary
conditions in Indian informal industry. In these pages Marx appears to be concerned
about two things. One, under what conditions do modern large-scale factories
emerge from existing decentralized workshops and domestic production. And two,
how is small-scale and domestic industry transformed when it becomes articulated
within a dominant industrial capitalist mode of production. Both these questions are
pertinent for us today.
Marx notes regarding the emergence of large industry:
To carry on trade as a manufacture, with concentration of workers, is
profitable only under exceptional conditions, because competition is at its
greatest between those workers who desire to work at home…and because
the capitalist, by scattering the work around, saves any outlay on workshops
etc. Nevertheless, the position of this specialized worker, who, although he
works at home, does so for a capitalist, is very different from that of the
independent craftsmen, who works for his own customers. (Marx 1992, pp.
462-463)
Here two issues of contemporary relevance are raised. Firstly, outsourcing to
smaller workshops can, under some circumstance, be more convenient, from the
capitalist’s point of view, than centralizing production in a factory, something we
observe repeatedly in the Indian experience, particularly in the neoliberal period.
One contemporary account of artisanal industry in India puts it thus:
The procurement of means of labour and the task of training for quality production are no longer concerns of the capitalist. Just as these are a bother of
the labourer, so also is the maintenance of the machinery and steady supply
of electricity and water. In this manner, almost the entire cost of managing
sustained production has been transferred to producer. (Sahasrabudhey
2001, p. 3)
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Secondly, the home-based artisan who works for merchant capital, though he
appears superficially similar to the independent craftsman of yore, is also very
different from him. In fact, Marx asserts:
This modern “domestic industry” has nothing except the name in common
with old-fashioned industry, the existence of which presupposes independent
urban handicrafts, independent peasant farming and above all, a dwellinghouse for the worker and his family. That kind of Industry has now been
converted into an external department of the factory…Besides the factory
worker, the workers engaged in manufacture, and the handicraftsmen, whom
it concentrates in large masses at one spot, and directly commands, capital
also sets another army in motion, by means of invisible threads: the
outworkers in the domestic industries, who live in the large towns as well as
being scattered over the countryside. An example: the shirt factory of Messrs
Tillie at Londonderry, which employs 1000 workers in the factory itself, and
9000 outworkers spread over the country districts. (Marx 1992, pp. 590-591,
emphasis added)
Capital thus organizes production in a familiar dual mode: large factories are
articulated with smaller workshops dependent upon the factory. Exploitation takes
different forms under these two circumstances.
In the so-called domestic industries…exploitation is still more shameless than
in modern manufacture, because the workers’ power of resistance declines
with their dispersal; because a whole series of plundering parasites insinuate
themselves between the actual employer and the worker he employs. (ibid,
p. 591, emphasis added)
Both the factors alluded to in the quote above remain relevant in Indian informal
industry today. The dispersal of the working class or, in some instances, the failure
of the working class to aggregate in the first place, results in the breaking of labor’s
resistance to exploitation by capital. And the rising importance of middlemen
creates channels for surplus extraction via unequal exchange.
Thus, in reading Marx on the evolution of modern industry one is often struck by the
resonance with Indian manufacturing today. The widespread prevalence of puttingout relations, the preponderance of merchant capital and of formal subsumption of
labor seems to suggest a type of capitalism that precedes in historical time, the
“full-fledged” industrial capitalism of Western Europe and North America. Does this
mean that the Indian economy is on the same transition path as the advanced
industrial economies? An awareness of the historical context cautions against any
such straightforward interpretation. The issue of the transition to industrial
capitalism and the disappearance of the informal sector is a very controversial one
in the literature and we do not enter into this debate here. Though it is worth
pointing out that in some ways this debate over contemporary economic reality
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mirrors the debate in Indian economic history over the fate of “traditional industry”
under colonialism.
In that debate, the “deindustrialization/nationalist” school maintained that
traditional industry was decimated due to competition from cheap manufactured
goods and deliberate colonial trade and industrial policy.9 A more recent
“revisionist” school countered that continuity rather than rupture marks the
artisanal landscape in colonial and post-colonial India (Roy, 1994). Simmons (1984)
offers a good overview of this debate along with key sources. The challenge lies in
reconstructing a picture that shows elements of continuity as well as change, while
maintaining a focus on the material conditions that keeps the working class
exploited and trapped in low productivity/low-wage work. This is precisely what
Marx hints at when he calls our attention to the differences and the similarities of
domestic and cottage industry subordinated to capital compared to pre-capitalist
artisanal production.
At the very least it can be said that rather than being annihilated, several types of
traditional industries survived with changes into the 20th century, and even grew in
size in some cases.
“In some cases, the growth of major craft towns of colonial India has been
truly staggering in the last 50 years. Surat at the turn of the century probably
employed about 5-6,000 weavers in silk and lace. Today, the direct
descendant of weaving, the powerloom, provides employment to about half a
million. Moradabad brassware engaged 7-8,000 full-time workers in 1924. In
the 1990s, an estimate places the town's metal workers at 150,000. Not more
than a few thousands were found in the carpets in Mirzapur-Bhadohi area in
the interwar period. 300,000 is the approximate figure in the 1990s. These
cases capture a steadily increasing share of the informal sector in industrial
wage-labour.” (Roy 1999)
Marx has sometimes been read in teleological fashion as asserting that the
particular transition from petty commodity production to small workshops and
domestic industry articulated with capitalism (putting-out) to large-scale factories
will be repeated wherever capitalism develops. However, it is also worth noting that
the period over which this transition occurs is around 300 years (from the 17th
century to the 19th centuries). One important factor that Marx did not incorporate in
his analysis is imperialism; later Marxists drew attention to imperialism and the
uneven development that characterizes the world capitalist system. It has been
argued that the incorporation of the Indian economy into the global capitalist
system creates conditions for the perpetuation of the informal sector and other low9

The early nationalist writers included R.C.Dutt and Rajani Palme Dutt. A more recent writer
holding this view is Bagchi (1976). An oft-cited macro statistic in this regard is Paul Bairoch’s
estimates of the “levels of industrialization” according to which India accounted for 25% of
world manufacturing output in 1750, 8.6% in 1860 and 1.7% in 1900. (quoted in Simmons
1984, Table 1)
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productivity activities. To this must be added another caveat. Modern large-sale
industry has in general displayed great capital intensity and a corresponding failure
to provide employment to a large fraction of society (even in China, the new
manufacturing powerhouse, the secondary sector currently employs only 23% of
the labor force). The persistence of small-scale production as “employer of last
report” raises important questions for the type of industrialization that should drive
the development process. We defer further comments on this issue until the
concluding section.

C. THE FORMAL AND THE INFORMAL IN INDIAN INDUSTRY
With the background laid out above, let us proceed to some statistics on the Indian
experience of the past few decades. Sectoral shares in employment and output for
India over the past century are shown in Figure 2a and Figure 2b. These data,
combined from various sources, are to be interpreted cautiously (not least because
“India” refers to a different geographical region pre and post-Independence).
However the salient feature is relatively uncontroversial: a decline in agricultural
employment and an increase in services followed by industry. The decline in
agriculture’s share of employment has been much slower than decline in share of
output, with consequences as noted in the previous section. Depending upon the
exact definition, the manufacturing sector’s current share in GDP is somewhere
between 20-25%. Total employment in this sector is about 45 million (about 18 % of
the labor force). The share of industrial sector in employment has increased, albeit
slowly, since the 1980s (14 to 18%)
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Tables 1 and 2 show the relative proportions of the formal and informal economies
in employment (as of 2000) and output (as of 2003) for the three sectors. Formal
firms accounted for around 60% of output and informal firms for 40%. According the
latest NSSO survey (covering the period 2005-2006) 36.44 million workers were
employed in the informal manufacturing sector. Thus around 75 % of the
manufacturing workforce is employed in the informal sector.
Table 1: Percentage share of formal versus informal contribution to GDP
in the three sectors, 2002-2003
Sector

Formal (% of
GDP)

Informal (% of
GDP)

Total

Agriculture, forestry and
fishing

4.1

95.9

100.0

Mining, manufacturing,
electricity and construction

60.5

39.5

100.0

Services

53.1

46.9

100.0

Total

43.3

56.7

100.0

Source: Sharma and Chitkara (2006) Measuring Contribution of Informal
Sector/Informal Employment to GDP, Expert Group on Informal Sector Statistics
(Delhi Group)
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Table 2: Percentage share of formal versus informal employment in
the three sectors, 1999-2000
Sector

Formal (% of
employment)

Informal (% of
employment)

Total

Agriculture, forestry and
fishing

0.86

99.14

100.0

Mining, manufacturing,
electricity and construction

24.47

75.53

100.0

Services

24.60

75.40

100.0

Source: Saha, Kar and Bhaskaran (2004) Measuring Informal Economy through
Income and Expenditure Surveys, Expert Group on Informal Sector Statistics (Delhi
Group)
As might be expected from its large size, the scope of informal activity is similarly
extensive. In India small-scale, informal industry produces food products,
beverages, cotton, wool, and silk textiles, wood and paper products, leather and
chemical products, metal products, electrical and transport equipment and repair
services of various kinds including repair of capital equipment. NSSO data indicate
that the food, textile and garment industries are the largest employers in the
informal manufacturing sector. Figure 3 shows the industries that account for about
90% of informal employment.
One main cause of anxiety regarding the development of industry in India has been
that the formal sector has displayed low employment elasticities. Figure 4 shows
that formal sector employment (industry and services) has been stagnant since the
1980s. In particular the post-reform period has seen growing informalization. The
share of large industry (usually defined as composed of firms employing more than
100 workers) in manufacturing employment grew from around 5% in 1900 to 30%
in 1980 and thereafter has declined to around 25 % (Figure 5).
Contrariwise, as mentioned earlier, the share of small-scale and informal industry in
employment has been high since colonial times and NSSO data since 1984
(discussed in more detail in the next section) shows that informal manufacturing
has held on to its employment share, perhaps even expanded it, in recent times.10
10

At the statistical level a vital caveat to NSS data is the underestimation of the informal
sector’s contribution to employment and income. According to one study of the Gujarat
ceramic manufactures industry (Das 2003) only about 3% of the total number of units
surveyed were reflected in the official statistics and similarly the official data on
employment was less than 2% of the study’s estimate. We take this issue up in a later
section.
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Figure 4: Employment in the formal sector (1980-2003) in millions (Source:
C.P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh11)
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The persistence of small-scale and cottage industry, both due to its acting as a
reserve for surplus labor and in part due to active government policy of support, on
the one hand, and support for large-scale modern industry on the other hand have
resulted in a firm size distribution displaying what Mazumdar and Sarkar (2008)
refer to as the “missing middle.” This refers to the low proportion of firms
employing more than 50 but less than 1000 or more workers (Figure 6). In part the
explanation may be found in incentives to reduce small firm size to less than 50
official workers in order to avoid compliance with labor and other laws. Beyond a

11

http://www.authorstream.com/presentation/Mudki-19349-Jayati-Ghosh-Recent-employment-trends-India-China-unfortunate-convergence-Asian-century-similar-eco-as-Entertainment-ppt-powerpoint/
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certain size, where non-registration is not an option, economies of scale may result
in large firm sizes.

In passing we note that the reasons why small firms are unable or unwilling to grow
are complex and are the subject of several official and academic studies. Figure 7
displays some of the key results from a survey of 1212 small firms (Morris et al
2001). These are responses to the question “Encircle the three most important
factors that have restricted your growth and development and rank them in order of
importance”. The scores have been adjusted for the rank, and fewer than three
responses.
D. PRODUCTION RELATIONS: A FIRST LOOK
Rather than focusing on firm size (large versus small), legal criteria (registered
versus unregistered) or employment regimes (regular, semi-regular, casual), in this
study our aim is to investigate the production relations and modes of surplus
extraction found in informal manufacturing firms. Harris (1982) comments referring
to categories based on firm size or scale (such as number of employees, size of
assets etc.).
“For analytical purposes these categories are quite clearly of very limited
value because they mostly rest upon numerically defined classes and may
subsume quite different forms of the production process and of relations of
production.” (p. 945)
The 62nd round of the National Sample Survey carried out in 2005-06 contains the
most recent national-level data on the informal manufacturing sector in India. Data
is also available from previous rounds conducted in 2000-2001, 1994-1995, 19891990 and 1984-1985 giving a broad overview of the evolution of informal industry
over the past 25 years.

43

Figure 6: Distribution of employment (in %) in manufacturing firms by employment
size groups. (ASI data) (Source: Mazumdar and Sarkar 2008)
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The first thing to note is that the number of informal manufacturing firms as well as
the number of workers has remained more or less constant over the past 25 years
(Figure 8).

How do informal manufacturing entreprises and workers vary across the states?
Figures 9 and 10 show the state-wise distribution of informal enterprise as well as
informal workers. Two states, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh account for 30
percent of all informal manufacturing enterprises as well as informal workers in the
country. Only the top ten states are shown in the figure (see NSS 62nd round Report
524, Statement 3b and Report 525, Statement 5A for entire list).
Depending on whether and how many wage-workers are employed in the firm, we
can categorize informal firms based on NSSO data as follows (the labels are ours):
1. Petty-proprietorships: These are called “Own Account Manufacturing Enterprises”
(OAMEs) in the NSSO data. The key defining feature is that no wage-workers are
employed. Use of family labor is common and many firms are situated on household
premises.
2. Marginal capitalist: These are called “Non Directory Manufacturing
Establishments” (NDMEs) in the NSSO data. They have at least one wage-worker
but no more than 5 wage and family workers taken together.
3. Small Capitalist: These are called “Directory Manufacturing Establishments”
(DMEs) in the NSSO data. These employ more than 5 but less than 20 workers (at
which point they should be included in the Annual Survey of Industries).
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Figure 9: Percentage share of informal manufacturing
enterprises
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Figure 10: Percentage share of informal manufacturing workers
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Petty-proprietorships are by far the most common type of production relation in
both rural and urban areas, in terms of both number of firms and number of
workers. However, relatively more marginal and small capitalist firms are found in
urban areas as compared to rural areas. The rural and urban percentage shares for
2005-2006 are shown in Figure 11a and Figure 11b and the all-India shares of firms
and workers are shown for the past 25 years in Figure 12a and Figure 12b.
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NSSO data also reveal that unpaid family members and other non-hired helpers
make up a very large part of the informal industrial working class. While 52% of
informal workers are “working owners,” and 24% are “hired workers,” the
remaining, fully 24% are categorized as “other workers,” i.e. unpaid domestic
workers. The majority of hired workers (85%) are male while the majority of “other
workers” (59%) are female (Government of India, 2008).
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E. ASSETS
In order to get a more detailed picture of these firms we next present some data on
types of assets owned and value added in manufacturing activity. In addition we
present some data on wage and profits shares in the aggregate in this sector.
Figure 13 shows that the workshop premise or home forms the single largest asset
for informal firms, accounting for 60-80% of assets.
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The percentage growth in market value of fixed assets owned by the three types of
informal enterprises over the period from 1994-95 to 2005-06 (adjusted for inflation
using the wholesale price index), is shown in the table below.
Table 3: Growth rate of fixed assets (1994-95 to 2005-06)
PP % growth
MC % growth
SC % growth

23.32
34.82
51.03

NSSO data also suggest that rented assets form an important part of the operation
of the informal manufacturing economy. In 2005-2006, across all three types of
informal firms, 30% of total assets were hired. While hired assets formed a greater
part of total assets for marginal and small capitalist firms, even for pettyproprietorships, nearly 25% of total assets were hired. Taken together with the data
presented later in the paper on use of credit, we note that so-called “petty
commodity producers” are in fact separated to a significant degree from the means
of production and that the circuit of capital for informal firms starts with money or
credit. In certain types of putting-out arrangements what appears to be petty
commodity production is in fact disguised wage-labor. We defer a more detailed
discussion of this to Section I and the concluding section.

F. GROSS VALUE ADDED
To calculate the gross value added in manufacturing two quantities are first
defined:
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1. Operating Expenses: “The total values of raw materials, electricity, fuel,
lubricants and auxiliary materials consumed; cost of maintenance, services
purchased and other expenses incurred during the reference period.” (Government
of India 2008c, p. 14)
2. Receipts: “The sale value of products and by-products manufactured by the
enterprise together with the value of services rendered to other concerns…” (ibid)
Then, Gross Value Added (GVA) = Total Receipts – Total Operating Expenses
While, as expected, value added has increased far more rapidly in formal
manufacturing as compared to the informal sector (Figure 14), it is interesting to
note that GVA has been increasing rapidly in the past decade across the informal
sector. Figure 15 shows this by removing the trendline for the formal sector.
Coupled with the fact that total informal industrial employment has not grown
similarly over the same period, we can infer than labor productivity has been
increasing in this sector.

Table 4 gives summary aggregate statistics for wage and profit shares as well as
average wages and profits per worker. An important caveat of theoretical as well as
practical importance must be mentioned here when considering the value-added
figures. Micro case studies reveal that in situations where long supply chains exist
linking the producer with the final consumer, the sale price of the producer (the
informal firm) is only a small part of the retail price paid by the final consumer.
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Figure 15: Gross Value Added by type of firm in the informal
sector
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TABLE 4: Gross Value Added and
Informal Firms
PP
Aggregate GVA (Billions
Rs)
280.61
Wage Share (Billions Rs.)
Profit Share (Billions Rs.)
No. of workers (millions)
23.69
19203.
GVA per firm (Rs)
00
11846.
GVA per worker (Rs)
00
number of workers/firm
1.62
Annual
emolument/worker (Rs)
-

2005

Wages Share for
MC

SC

211.20
384.05
124.71
206.85
86.51
177.41
5.78
6.98
119302. 558513.
00
00
36543.0 55052.0
0
0
3.26
10.15
21576.0 29635.0
0
0
14967.0 25417.0
Profit/per worker (Rs)
0
0
Source: Report 526, and Report 525, Statements 10 and
12
This problem is particularly accentuated when the value chain is global. As
Chakrabarti and Varman (2009) note in their study of the Kanpur leather cluster,
“almost 80 per cent of the final price of the shoe goes to the long chain of
middlemen who operate only in the post-production stage. Or in other words,
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four-fifths of the ‘value addition’ of shoes in the global value chain actually
adds no value to the product.”
Heintz (2003, 2006) has developed a model in the “unequal exchange tradition” of
Emmanuel, Prebisch and Singer, that attempts to capture the unequal distributional
consequences of a global production system where “large retailers or brand-name
corporations set up a decentralized system of production and distribution.” Here
Actual production is subcontracted out to small producers who face
extremely competitive conditions (Carr, Chen, and Tate 2000, Bonacich and
Appelbaum 2000, Gereffi 1994). Retailers and brand-name multinationals
enjoy some degree of market power which they can use to keep prices low
for the goods they purchase or to earn rents through the development of
monopolistic brand identities. (Heintz 2003)
He further argues that
by combining the specific insights of global commodity chain analysis with
the theoretical innovations of the unequal exchange traditions, a model of
these relationships can be developed that explores the distributive
consequences of the expansion of globalized manufacturing tied to affluent
consumer markets through the institutional linkages of global commodity
chains.
We note in passing that this issue is still relevant even when commodity chains are
only regional or national in scope.

G. CREDIT
According to NSSO data in 2005-06 outstanding loans were 21.6% of total fixed
assets owned, at the all India level. While nearly 50% of the credit in rural and
urban areas came from government agencies, public sector and cooperative banks,
or other institutional sources (such as the Khadi and Village Industries Commission),
private money-lenders along with other informal sources such as friends and
relatives accounted for 15% of outstanding loans at the all-India level. Expectedly,
formal sources of credit were more important for small capitalists as compared to
marginal capitalists and petty-proprietors. Petty-proprietors are the worst hit by
money-lenders. The percentage of loans from money-lenders to rural pettyproprietors has actually increased substantially in the period from 1994-95 to 200506, while it has decreased for every other category as seen in the figure. The figure
of 25% can be compared to the proportion of loans going to farmers from moneylenders reported in the section on agriculture.
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Figure 16: Percentage of loans to informal manufacturing enterprises
coming from money-lenders (blue: 1994-95, magenta: 2005-06)
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The usurious nature of money-lender credit is apparent when we note that the
“annual interest payable as a percentage of loan amount outstanding” is on
average ten percentage points higher (at 26%) than formal sources of credit
(around 15%).

H. SHORTCOMINGS OF NSS DATA
Das (2003) has carried out a micro-level case study of the ceramic ware
manufacturing sub-sector in Gujarat specifically to uncover the shortcomings of
national level NSS data, which result in part from problems with including/excluding
specific sub-sectors below the two-digit level National Industry Classification (NIC).
The key points that emerge from this study are:
1. At a greater level of disaggregation of industrial classification it is seen that NSS
data has improved vastly over time to include more and more previously missed
types of industries. For example early NSS data (1978-79) estimated no informal
enterprises in manufacturing or processing of cotton textiles, and in drugs,
cosmetics and washing and cleaning preparations, both of which consist of several
informal units in Gujarat (and most likely elsewhere as well).
2. The National Sample Surveys are likely to underestimate, in some cases severely,
the number of informal enterprises and as a result the size of informal employment.
For example, the ceramic ware sub-sector had one surveyed unit and an estimated
eight units in the informal sector according to 1994-95 NSS data. Das (2003) found
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at least 164 and possibly as many as 229 informal units. The corresponding
employment estimates were 24 workers for ceramic ware industry in Gujarat
according to NSS (1994-95) data and anywhere between 1,292-1,802 workers as
per the Das (2003) study. Thus only about 3% of the total number of units surveyed
were reflected in the official statistics and similarly the official data on employment
was less than 2% of the study’s estimate.
3. Annual emoluments for all non OAME’s according to NSS 2005-2006 is Rs.
26,682. Das (2003) reveals wages around Rs. 18,000 (assuming regular year-long
employment). The piece rate system was widely prevalent though it does not
feature prominently in the official statistics.
4. Only around 28% of informal enterprises had no hired workers (the macro NSS
data reports a much larger percentage). Around 88% of informal units were single
proprietor units and nearly 50% of employees in informal units were family
members (unpaid labor).

I. A FRAMEWORK FOR DISCUSSING PRODUCTION RELATION IN THE
INFORMAL SECTOR
While the NSSO data serves well as a first pass on the types of production relations
in the informal sector, the true complexity is revealed only via micro case studies.
Using examples from different informal industries including Agra footwear, Lucknow
Chikan, Gujarat Ceramics, and UP and TN Handlooms, and a 1991 survey of 1500
artisan households involved in 15 different export-oriented handicraft industries, we
offer a schematic look at these production relations and the principal ways in which
surplus extraction is facilitated.
The variety of production relations observed empirically can be captured in a simple
matrix (see Table 5) where the two axes are control over labor process and product,
and control over capital. A simple dichotomy can be made between selfdirection/ownership and other-direction/ownership.
The informal manufacturing sector displays a great variety of production relations in
which the producer retains or losses control over the means of production and the
labor process to varying degrees. The “classical artisan” mode consists of say a
weaver, a metal-worker, a leather-worker who owns his own means of production,
works in his own house or workshop and produces for the market. She or he also
retains control over a self-directed labor process. However, as capitalism
undermines the conditions of existence of independent commodity production, selfownership of capital does not necessarily mean self-direction in the labor process.
Recall Marx’s comment above, with respect to the domestic worker that the
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…the position of this specialized worker, who, although he works at home,
does so for a capitalist, is very different from that of the independent
craftsmen, who works for his own customers. (Marx, 1992, p. 462-463)
Capitalist relations may thus show up first not in the separation of the producer
from the means of production but rather in a slow loss of control over the process
and product of labor. Or conversely, ownership of the means of production does not
automatically entail ownership of the product of labor or control over the process of
labor.
The “putting-out” mode of production is historically a result of the subordination of
artisanal production to merchant capital. Typically a merchant or his representative
supplies orders (and in some instances raw materials or working capital) to the
producer and collects the finished product at an agreed upon price or piece-wage.
One account of the contemporary small-scale industry describes the situation thus:
Under the new system capitalists exercise tight control in the market of raw
material and finished products. Production is organized through a supply of
raw material to sites of production spread out in houses and huts. A battery
of middlemen and contractors operates at several levels. In many cases
these levels are so numerous that the producer knows nothing about the
master. Wage and quality controls are exercised by middlemen. This
arrangement has spread quickly in textile, hosiery, readymade clothes,
electrical devices, small machines and leather works. Of late, ironwork, claywork, carpentry and stone work has also been brought within the ambit of
this system. We are witnessing a transformation of villages, mohallas and
towns into large factories, a transformation, which has no precedent.
(Sahasrabudhey, 2001)
Today putting-out goes by the name of sub-contracting and is a widely discussed
phenomenon in mainstream international economics as global commodity chains
become increasingly elaborated. The putting-out variations found in Indian informal
industry are described in Table 5.12
PO-I or Putting-out variation I- The producer works on his/her own premises with
own equipment and own working capital, in a self-directed labor-process but hands
over product to one or few middlemen. He/she may also be dependent upon the
same merchant for access to working capital or credit. This type of arrangements is
found among other places in the Agra footwear industry.
PO-II or Putting-out variation II- The producer works on own premises with own
equipment but with borrowed working capital, in a self-directed labor-process and
hands over product to merchant capitalist or his representative. This is also a
commonly found type of relation in the handloom and powerloom sectors.
12

We thank Mohan Rao for the framework behind the typology depicted in Tables 5 and 6.
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Table 5: A typology of production relations in the Indian informal
manufacturing sector
Labor

Self product and Self process,
process
other product

Other product
and process

Self fixed and
working

Classical artisan/ PO-I
independent
producer

Rare

Self fixed,

Rare

PO-II

PO-IV

Other fixed and Rare
working

PO-III

Classical
industrial
capitalist

Capital

other working

PO-III or Putting-out variation III- The producer works on other’s premises or with
rented equipment and working capital but in a self-directed labor-process and
hands product over to merchant capitalist. Weavers in rural areas (sometimes
called “dependent weavers”) often labor under such relations.
PO- IV or Putting-out variation IV- Producer works in own premises with own
equipment but borrowed working capital but produces only a small part of a
marketable product according to a capital-imposed division of labor. For example in
the Lucknow chikan industry, the women who perform embroidery do so in their
own homes with their own equipment with raw material being provided by a
merchant capitalist’s agent. The producers (embroiders) do not have a product of
their own to sell.
However the matrix above is missing a crucial aspect of the informal manufacturing
sector which is important for understanding exploitation in the sector. This element
is control over the product and factor markets, i.e. access to credit and raw
materials and access to markets for finished goods, which is a function of market
power and the structure of markets in general. This axis is particularly useful in
revealing exploitation via unequal exchange which is potentially hidden in the
typology above. A self-employed artisan with control over the process and product
of labor may nevertheless lose independence via the loss of control over a market.
This situation is depicted in Table 6.
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Table 6: Petty-proprietorships and market access

Market

LaborSelf product and
process

Self access

Independent
producer

Other access

Dependent
producer

Dependent producer - Producer works on own premises with own equipment and
own working capital, not on order from any merchant, yet must eventually sell to
one or a few merchant capitalist usually in an unequal exchange relationship. This
highlights the fact that apparently self-employed workers can be at the mercy of
various merchants and middlemen who make themselves vital to the survival of the
producers either by extending trade credit or by retaining control over the market.
In the next section we offer an example of this phenomenon from the Agra footwear
industry.
Relating our typology to Roy’s (1993) typology, we can say that the “classical
artisan” corresponds to Roy’s “independent weavers” (sale of product not tied to
one buyer, no monopsony) and the putting-out variations correspond to the two
types of “dependent weavers,” those employed on piece contracts (“seller of cloth”,
PO- I and II) versus those on wage-employment (“seller of labor”, PO- III), the
capitalist in the first instances being a merchant or money-lender and the second
case being a larger producer-cum-merchant. An example of PO- III has been
reported in Mau, UP, where large producers lease out looms to weavers. “Workers
work in their own house but on someone else’s looms.” (Roy, 1993, p. 207)
These categories are also fluid and changing. For example in the Bhavani handloom
industry in Tamil Nadu described by de Neve (2005) many capitalist owners of
workshops who previously employed weavers on piece-wages began to sell or lease
their looms to master-weavers to whom they provided yarn. The problems of
managing the looms and disciplining labor were thus transferred from the merchant
capitalist to the master-artisan. Further, the master-weavers are not owners of the
product since they have been sub-contracted by merchants to whom they must
return the finished product.
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Lastly, it should be noted that the fluidity of production relations is also manifested
at the level of the individual worker who may work on piece-wages today, be a
small contractor of laborers tomorrow and work on a factory shop-floor on the third
day.
J. MODES OF SURPLUS EXTRACTION
As elaborated in the introduction, a “mode of surplus extraction” refers to the
specific way in which unpaid labor is extracted from the producers and appropriated
by the dominant classes. In advanced capitalist economies such as the United
States, the employer-employee relationship (the wage-labor/capital relation) forms
the single most important mode of surplus extraction although in the neoliberal
period unequal exchange between larger and smaller capitalists via sub-contracting
has assumed renewed importance. In contrast, developing economies such as India
are characterized by a much greater variety of modes. Broadly speaking we may
distinguish between three principal modes: wage-labor, unpaid work, and unequal
exchange. In the first case surplus is pumped out of direct producers by ensuring
that workers produce greater value than is returned to them in the form of wages.
In the second case, one vital to both peasant production and artisanal production,
the labor of women and children is extracted in return for direct subsistence. In the
third case, the surplus produced in small-scale production, even if it be first
appropriated by the direct producer, is eventually transferred from the producer to
the merchant capitalist or from a small producer to a large producer (in the case of
sub-contracting).
Below we consider some specific institutional ways in which surplus extraction is
achieved in the informal economy.
I. Piece wages
The NSSO does not gather data on whether wages paid in the informal sector are
piece-wages or time-wages but we know from several case-studies that piecewages are still widely prevalent in small-scale manufacturing. In the Gujarat
ceramic study cited earlier (Das 2003) 88% of informal units and 47.5% of formal
units followed the piece-rate system. In a 1991 survey of 365 handicraft artisan
units, 96% paid piece-wages (Vijayagopalan 1993). Marx (1992) notes the salient
features of piece-wages:
The quality of the labor is here controlled by the work itself, which must be of
average perfection if the piece-price is to be paid in full. Piece-wages
become, from this point of view, the most fruitful source of reductions of
wages and capitalistic cheating…They furnish to the capitalist an exact
measure for the intensity of labor (p. 694).
Further,
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Given piece-wage, it is naturally the personal interest of the laborer to strain
his labor-power as intensely as possible; this enables the capitalist to raise
more easily the normal degree of intensity of labor. It is moreover now the
personal interest of the laborer to lengthen the working-day, since with it his
daily or weekly wages rise (p. 695).
Thus piece wages achieve an increased rate of exploitation via increasing intensity
of labor and a lengthened working day while at the same time they obviate the
need for control by the capitalist over the labor process.
Since the quality and intensity of the work are here controlled by the form of
wage itself, superintendence of labor becomes in great part superfluous. (p.
695)
Hence Marx’s conclusion “that piece-wage is the form of wages most in harmony
with the capitalist mode of production.” (pp. 697-98)
The two types of putting-out relations described by Marx, which give rise to a
“hierarchically organized system of exploitation and oppression,” are still applicable
to informal manufacturing in India:
On the one hand, piece-wages facilitate the interposition of parasites
between the capitalist and the wage-laborer, the “sub-letting of labor.” The
gain of these middlemen comes entirely from the difference between the
labor-price which the capitalist pays, and the part of that price which they
actually allow to reach the laborer. (p. 695)
We will shortly see examples of such exploitation via unequal exchange. And,
On the other hand, piece-wage allows the capitalist to make a contract for so
much per piece with the head laborer-in manufactures with the chief of some
group, in mines with the extractor of the coal, in the factory with the actual
machine-worker — at a price for which the head laborer himself undertakes
the enlisting and payment of his assistant work people. The exploitation of
the laborer by capital is here effected through the exploitation of the laborer
by the laborer (p. 695, emphasis added)
Both the systems noted above are found in the Agra footwear industry. For
example, master artisans take responsibility for an order, execute part of the work
themselves and recruit additional artisans as needed to fulfill the order, and
merchants directly put-out orders to artisans who work on their own-account, with
unpaid family labor to the deliver the product (Knorringa 1999). In general
“exploitation of the laborer by the laborer” exactly characterizes production
relations in the informal economy.
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II. Unequal exchange
The issue of unequal exchange and the "exploitation" of petty-producers and small
capitalists by merchant capital is ubiquitous in the literature on artisans (see Portes
and Walton 1981, Roy 1993, Knorringa 1999, Wilkinson-Weber 1999,). Yet few
quantitative studies exist on the aggregate amount of surplus that is siphoned off in
this fashion. Asymmetric market power needed for unequal exchange exists
because typically many artisans must compete for the business of one or a few
traders. An early 1990s survey of around 1500 self-employed handicraft producers
found that around 50% of the artisans obtained their raw materials from traders
(who placed the order) and around 90% handed over the finished product to
middlemen/traders (Vijayagopalan 1993). Knorringa (1999) provides institutional
detail in his study of the Agra shoe industry:
Because plenty of anonymous artisans must bargain with a limited number of
identifiable traders and because the small quantities allow for easy, quick,
and accurate inspection, the margins for artisans are pushed down…
Moreover with all their working capital tied up in one production cycle,
artisans in a direct sales channel cannot postpone selling. (p. 314)
Traders, on the other hand, can wait for artisan profit margins to decline. Further,
traders also double as financiers extending credit in the form of leather raw
material. Since these artisans are owners of their home-based production units and
working capital this is a typical example of hidden dependency of self-employed
artisans.
As mentioned earlier, depending on how prevalent such situations are, they cast
doubt on aggregate value-added numbers. Since value-added is calculated simply
by subtracting raw material costs from total receipts unequal exchange, by
increasing input prices and decreasing output prices and thereby squeezing
margins, will result in low value-added estimates.
Apart from monopsonistic or monopolistic situations, extensive middlemen
networks also serve to reduce the price paid to the artisan per piece. In Mexico’s
garment industry, domestic women workers work on piece wages using their own
sewing machines.
A blouse which retails for 120 pesos costs the merchant 60 pesos, plus the
cost of the material which he has given ready-cut to the broker. The broker
pays the seamstress 15-20 pesos and keeps the rest for himself. (Lomnitz,
quoted in Portes and Walton, 1981, p. 99)
To accomplish the production target the seamstress may require the help of her
children, mother, neighbors etc. This work is unpaid. Here we witness a common
way of increasing absolute surplus value, by engaging not only the artisan but
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his/her entire family for one person’s wage. Further, workers assume the costs of
errors in production.
In the Lucknow Chikan industry middlemen (beechwaale), also called agents,
perform the work of bringing cloth and other raw materials to the embroider at her
home and then carrying off the finished product. Social norms around gender make
producers accessible only to men who are the women’s relatives and neighbors.
Agents locate, recruit, and control labor that is otherwise inaccessible to the
holder of capital. The agent is often a relative, or at least a neighbor of the
women he employs, family members usually having preference in the
allocation of work. For the rest, while agents do not control embroiderers by
directly overseeing their work, they do impose a rudimentary discipline upon
them by adjusting the flow of work according to the relative productivity of
each woman, and adjusting wages as a means of penalizing deficient workers
and rewarding good ones. In this way, agents effectively release the
mahajans from the need to intervene directly in the labor process (WilkinsonWeber 1997, p. 59).
Agents are paid by the traders/merchants per piece and in turn pay the producer.
In Lucknow in 1990, prices started at around ten rupees for a small child's
kurta (shirt), rising to 60 rupees for a man's kurta, simply embroidered.'
Women's salwar-kamiz (tunic-pants ensembles) ranged in price from 40 to
more than 100 rupees. Finely embroidered items, as well as large pieces like
saris and tablecloths, cost several hundred rupees. Piece wages for
embroidery on these items were as low as a single rupee for kurta
embroidery in the village, five to fifteen rupees for salwar-kamiz embroidery
in town, and up to 100 rupees for top-ticket items. In very rare
circumstances, a highly skilled embroiderer might collect more than 100
rupees for a specially commissioned piece obtained directly from the trader.
At the other extreme, most women get their work through agents, who take a
substantial cut from the piece wage, so that the women get no more than a
fraction of a rupee for embroidering the most commonly sold item, a kurta.
As might be expected, few embroiderers can afford to buy the products they
make. (ibid, p. 52)
While male agents admit to taking at least 50 percent and sometimes more of the
piece wage for themselves, female agents take less. (p. 60)
While one could make the case that given the technical conditions of production,
the middlemen perform an essential function bringing together the components of
the final commodity, it should be noted that their compensation can be far in excess
of the labor they expend. Middlemen wages may thus be seen as cut of the surplus
rather than wages per se, being proportional not to the labor expended but the
scale of operation. This is analogous to Adam Smith’s observation that profit of
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enterprise should not be viewed as wages for supervision since profits are
proportional not to labor expended by the capitalist but rather to the stock of capital
employed.
A last point to note is that exchange relations manifested in these terms of trade
act in concert with production relations. Production relations (including but not
limited to asset ownership patterns) determine market power. Market power and
resulting terms of trade determine current income. Income determines future assets
and production relations. It is important to emphasize this dual nature because
arguments that limit themselves to deteriorating terms of trade or non-competitive
market structures often do not question why the conditions of exchange are what
they are. Why are rates of return on capital reaching 30 or 40% demanded from
small producers? Perhaps because production is fragmented and volumes of loans
are small, or purchase volumes are small, and transactions costs are large.
Relations of production thus underlie relations of exchange. It is not only because
intermediaries manipulate and monopolize that we get unequal exchange, but
rather production relations can create the conditions for unequal exchange, which
are exploited by intermediaries. This is not news. In fact such an argument forms
the classical rationale for the formation of producer and peasant cooperatives.

III. Labor Bondage
Das (2003) in Gujarat Ceramics and De Neve (2005) in Tamil Nadu handlooms and
powerlooms describe the practice of “consumption advances” which are used to
hold workers in bondage. These advances (called “baki” in TN) can amount to as
much as one year’s worth of wages for the worker and binds him to the employer
until the loan is paid off, which may never happen.
Consumption advances were viewed in the modes of production debate as a type of
feudal or semi-feudal arrangement which makes labor unfree. However the situation
here is more complex. It is true that these advances often function as a device to
retain skilled labor that reduces costs of replacement and training. However the
resulting “rigidity” in the size of the labor force is also cited by employers as a
problem during lean times or in dealing with “problem” workers. Further, workers
retain mobility by transferring loans to new employers.

IV. Gender and Caste
Exploitation of unpaid domestic labor especially of women and children is ubiquitous
in household enterprises. In addition to unpaid market work (to be distinguished
from non-market work performed by women), women’s paid work is often devalued
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as well. The Lucknow Chikan industry provides an archetypal example of surplus
extraction achieved via devaluing of women’s paid work.
Women's embroidery, made in the home, is looked upon with far less respect
than the products of men, made in their workshops. Chikan embroidery is
thus not regarded seriously as an occupation in spite of the fact that many
families depend upon the income they derive from it. In fact, it is customarily
referred to by mahajans as "free-time" work to fill in the hours between
cooking, cleaning, and caring for children. As an extension of women's unpaid
household tasks, chikan is barely real work at all. Indeed, some mahajans
regard themselves as doing women a favor by paying them to do leisure
activities. As one put it, "They just sit around and they get work, and they get
money. All in their spare time! I'm the one with all the headaches."
(Wilkinson-Weber, 1997, p. 62)
Another avenue for the devaluing of productive work is via caste. Agra’s footwear
industry offers a typical example of a caste-based division between artisans who
produce a commodity and traders/merchants who sell it. Producers are chamars (an
untouchable caste) while merchants are upper-caste Hindus from Punjab. In general
the “producer castes” (artisans and peasants) are often shudras (OBCs) or dalits
(SCs) while the traders and other non-productive workers belong to the forward
castes. However, even in instances where employers and workers belong to the
same caste, this may strengthen rather than undermine the regime of exploitation.
For example Engelshoven (1999) alludes to the Surat diamond cutting industry
where both employers and employees are Saurashtra Patels. While the caste
monopoly helps workers retain some job security, it also make it difficult for them to
challenge exploitation since community bonds are supposed to trump class
contradictions. As a result there has been no strike in this industry.
Thus Gender and Caste hierarchies can serve to enhance surplus extraction
occurring via wage-labor or unequal exchange. This highlights the importance of
understanding how exploitation is produced at the intersection of several
hierarchies. The intention is not to reduce Gender or Caste oppression to class
exploitation, but rather to elucidate how each of these may reinforce (and at times
undermine) the other.

K. SUMMARY AND AGGREGATE TRENDS
In the second part of this study we have attempted to take a broad look at the
organization of informal industry in India. In particular we have focused on the
evolution of firm size, the types of production relations and the modes of surplus
extraction prevailing in informal industry. The following points should be
emphasized:
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1. The industrial sector as a whole (formal and informal) has not expanded greatly
in terms of employment in the past three decades and today stands at around 18%
(compared to China’s 24%) of total employment in the Indian economy.
2. The informal sector still accounts for around 75% of industrial employment in
India. The employment share of the formal sector in general and large-scale
industry in particular has been stagnant for the past three decades.
3. The number of informal firms and workers has been more of less stationary since
the 1980s and the relative shares of petty-proprietorships, marginal and small
capitalist firms is also largely unaltered.
4. Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal account for 30% of informal manufacturing
enterprises as well as informal workers.
5. Food products, textiles and garments are the top three informal employers
accounting for nearly 50% of employment.
6. Most informal firms do not own substantial amounts of capital equipment. The
land or building on which the firm is situated accounts for 60-80% of asset value for
informal firms. In 2005-2006, across all three types of informal firms, 30% of total
assets were hired. While hired assets formed a greater part of total assets for
marginal and small capitalist firms, even for petty-proprietorships, nearly 25% of
total assets were hired.
7. Even though GVA for the formal sector far outstrips GVA in the informal sector,
value added in informal industry has increased significantly in the last decade.
Since the number of workers has remained more or less the same, this suggests
that labor productivity has been rising in this sector.
8. GVA calculations do not usually take into account the effect of unequal exchange
and global value chains. High input prices and low output prices (unfavorable terms
of trade) faced by small producers accentuate the problem of low value added in
manufacturing.
9. Credit is important for all informal producers but petty-proprietors are the worst
hit by money-lenders. The percentage of loans from money-lenders to rural pettyproprietors has actually increased substantially in the period from 1994-95 to 200506, while it has decreased for every other category during the same period.
10. The relations of production in informal industry are neither purely independent
producer (characterized by producer’s control over the labor process and ownership
of capital) nor only industrial capitalist (characterized by a proletarian workforce
and a real subsumption of labor to capital). Rather a spectrum of putting-out
relations based on formal subsumption of labor and a reliance on extraction of
absolute rather than relative surplus value is observed.
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11. In addition to putting-out arrangements, nominally self-employed or
independent producers are often locked into a relation of dependency vis-à-vis
merchant and finance capital. This situation is closely analogous to the position of
the peasant in the countryside with respect to intermediaries.
12. Piece-wages, unequal exchange, bonded labor, contingent and casual labor, and
gender and caste oppression all conspire to increase the producer’s exploitation
largely via extraction of absolute surplus value.
13. It is widely recognized that in the face of the failure of modern industry to
expand satisfactorily, informal industry has acted as the “employer of last resort”
for surplus labor in the agricultural sector. However NSS data also shows that
employment in informal manufacturing has been more of less constant since the
1980s. Thus it can be inferred that informal retail as well as informal labor in
construction have largely absorbed the increase in the labor force.
14. Relations of dependency and lack of resources as well as incentives for technical
change keep informal workers trapped in low productivity, low wage work. Surplus
labor, low wages and intense (self) exploitation in turn create disincentives for
technical change.
15. From the point of view of the large or formal-sector capitalist (whether merchant
or industrial) sub-contracting arrangements retain advantages of economies of
scale in purchase of means of production while circumventing the costs associated
with a formal labor force. Number of workers protected by legislation is kept to a
necessary minimum while much labor-intensive (skilled and unskilled) work is
contracted out to informal units. Through employment of unpaid family labor and
labor paid below official minimum wage, informal firms are able to survive and
formal firms are able to extract larger amounts of surplus value. The disintegration
of the textile mills and their conversion into powerloom sweat-shops is an example
of this process.
16. Labor bondage, gender and caste hierarchies, unpaid domestic work and
contingent and casual labour can all be understood as attempts to increase
absolute surplus value. This reinforces the fact that in all these cases, there is
formal rather than real subsumption of labor by capital. The incentive to alter the
methods of production or adopt new techniques of production comes, in these
circumstances, from the direct producer, who however, lacks the resources to
undertake this task. Capitalists in the formal sector do not have the incentive to
undertake technical change because under formal subsumption of labor there is no
drive to increase relative surplus value. Efforts to increase productivity and reduce
work burdens are thus doubly undermined as producers, who have the incentive do
not control their own surplus while capitalists, given a large labor force ready to
work for extremely low wages, have resources but do not face incentives for
technical change. Naturally, we do not mean to imply that the above-stated reason
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is the only factor in continued low labor productivities observed in informal
manufacturing, but it is nevertheless an important part of the story.

PART III: CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, we would like to raise some political and philosophical issues
and questions for further discussion without in any way claiming to have arrived at
any conclusive answers. Though both the authors largely agree as to the aggregate
trends presented above, we derive different political and social implications from
these trends. This derives partly from different political and philosophical
perspectives that both of us see ourselves closest to. Rather than paper over our
differences, we therefore, present our alternative viewpoints, which might even be
contradictory, for further debate and discussion.
The first issue that we wish to put forward for discussion relates to the dynamics of
class differentiation. As we have seen, both in agriculture and in industry, the
persistence of petty production is a characteristic feature of Indian capitalism; what
does this imply? It implies that almost all members of the working class occupy, at
different points in time, multiple positions in the structure of production, i.e., within
a short time span, each member of the working population participates in multiple
production relations and her consciousness is shaped by these multiple, and often
drastically, different objective positions in the production process . Even a casual
glance at rural India demonstrates this multiplicity. At one time a worker is an
agricultural labourer, exploited through the institution of wage-labour; at another
time, often within weeks or months, she is a tenant cultivator, hiring in land from
the local landlord and facing exploitation through semi-feudal methods; at another
point she is a petty producer, operating as a owner-operator of a small business and
using family labour for production purposes.
This multiplicity of objective positions in the production process has very important
implications for the process of class differentiation and development of
revolutionary class consciousness: class differentiation that was observed in Europe
(and in particular in England), during its capitalist transformation, differentiation of
society between a relatively homogeneous proletariat (who only sell their labourpower) and a capitalist class (who only appropriate surplus value through the
institution of wage-labour), is not what we observe today in India (and other
similarly placed ex-colonies). Thus, the capitalism that is developing in India is
drastically different from the one that developed in Europe between the latter half
of 16th and 18th centuries. In the Indian case, the persistence of petty production in
agriculture, industry as well as services has been interpreted as arrested class
differentiation. However a closer look at the evolving relations of production reveals
that class differentiation is proceeding, albeit in a way different from the European
case. For example the differentiation that is taking place in rural India is more
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between a heterogeneous rural gentry and a heterogeneous rural poor, than
between capitalist and worker. In industry too, the apparent preponderance of petty
production hides the extent of wage-labor, for example by making a piece-rate
wage worker appear as an own-account producer. Both in agriculture and in
industry the actual extent of alienated labor is hidden by a semblance of private
property.
If the class differentiation at the lower end of the social and economic hierarchy is
masked by participation of members of the working population in multiple relations
of production, the rural gentry at the other end of the spectrum is also a complex
entity. How did this rural gentry come into being? Land reforms, of a decidedly timid
variety, “sliced off a bit of the old land-owning classes, those that owned enormous
estates, and incorporated a small upper section of the tenants in the land-owning
group, thus creating a broader strata of landowners…” (Desai, 1986: quoted in
Balagopal, 1986). Members of the rural gentry have, over the years, lost some of
the monopoly over land, as we have seen, but facing this decline, have nicely
“diversified” their portfolios into other areas of rural economic life, thereby
maintaining their hold over rural society (Metcalf, 1967). Facilitated by a pliable
state, members of this class gradually got involved in trade and usury, in
government contracts for infrastructure works, in building and maintaining hotels,
cinema theatres, petrol pumps, etc. They continue to rely heavily on their
relationship to the State to facilitate the reproduction of their capital; and without
exception, they are the local notables of mainstream political parties, often
maintaining their own militias to politically intimidate the local population.
It is difficult to differentiate, within the rural gentry, between feudal interests and
capitalist interests, as much as it is difficult to differentiate between different
varieties of capital: industrial, merchant, usurious. Analogously, from the point of
view of the working class, it is difficult to identify where surplus extraction via
unequal exchange stops and that via wage-labor begins. As feudal methods of
surplus extraction, like tenancy, declined and as their hold on the monopoly of land
dwindled, members of the rural gentry painlessly morphed into capitalist farmers
and local merchants. Some started industrial activities with the support of the State,
while others ploughed their capital into money-lending. It is worth noting that never
in independent India have the class of capitalist farmers taken up arms against the
so-called feudal interests in land; the contradiction, to the extent it ever existed
between these fractions of the rural ruling classes, have been resolved in the most
amicable manner.
The second issue worth considering is the continued centrality of the agrarian
question to any project for revolutionizing Indian society. This follows simply from
the fact that the majority of the working people in India are related, directly or
indirectly, with the agricultural sector; this is a direct result of the failure of the
structural transformation of the Indian economy. Any attempt, therefore, at radical
reconstruction of Indian society will have to deal with the agrarian question
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effectively. Dealing with the agrarian question will mean, among other things,
rapidly increasing the productivity of agricultural activity, the surest way to increase
the income of the vast masses of the working people involved in agriculture and
thereby create a home market for domestic industry.
The Marxist tradition has seen redistributive land reforms as essential to the project
of dealing with the agrarian question. The reasons have primarily been political,
though some economic arguments have also been developed.13 Politically, land
reforms have been seen as a way to decisively break the power of the parasitic
class of feudal and semi-feudal landlords; economically, it has been understood as
creating conditions for the development of the productive forces in rural society,
increasing the productivity of labour, creating a surplus for supporting
industrialization and providing a market for domestic industry.
Using Lenin’s distinction between the Prussian and the American paths for
bourgeois development in the rural economy lends credence to the call for
redistributive land reforms. Discussing the “two forms” of bourgeois development
out of the feudal and semi-feudal order characterized by serfdom in late 19th
century Russia, he says:
The survivals of serfdom may fall away either as a result of the
transformation of landlord economy or as a result of the abolition of the
landlord latifundia, i. e., either by reform or by revolution. Bourgeois
development may proceed by having big landlord economies at the head,
which will gradually become more and more bourgeois and gradually
substitute bourgeois for feudal methods of exploitation. It may also proceed
by having small peasant economies at the head, which in a revolutionary
way, will remove the “excrescence” of the feudal latifundia from the social
organism and then freely develop without them along the path of capitalist
economy.
Those two paths of objectively possible bourgeois development we would call
the Prussian path and the American path, respectively. In the first case feudal
landlord economy slowly evolves into bourgeois, Junker landlord economy,
which condemns the peasants to decades of most harrowing expropriation
and bondage, while at the same time a small minority of Grossbauern (“big
peasants”) arises. In the second case there is no landlord economy, or else it
is broken up by revolution, which confiscates and splits up the feudal estates.
In that case the peasant predominates, becomes the sole agent of
agriculture, and evolves into a capitalist farmer. In the first case the main
content of the evolution is transformation of feudal bondage into servitude
13

Patnaik (1972) summarily rejects any economic rationale for land reforms and instead
stresses the political logic; but Patnaik (1976) and Patnaik (1986) develop an explicitly economic logic for land reforms in terms of overcoming the ground rent barrier to capitalist development.
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and capitalist exploitation on the land of the feudal landlords—Junkers. In the
second case the main background is transformation of the patriarchal
peasant into a bourgeois farmer. (Lenin, 1907).
The three main communist streams in India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist),
the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation and the Communist Party
of India (Maoist) more or less accept this distinction, the first two explicitly and the
last one implicitly.14 Hence, for all the three streams the main task (or axis) of the
current stage of the Peoples (or New) Democratic Revolution is the agrarian
revolution, with redistributive land reforms being one of its main tasks.
While it is true that India, because it did not witness any serious efforts at land
reforms on a national scale, developed along the landlord path out of semifeudalism, there are some important differences that need to be considered. One
pole of landlord capitalism, viz., landlessness has been growing over the years; the
other pole of landlord capitalism, viz., the continued dominance of a few “big
peasants” seems to be at variance with the evidence. Aggregate level data about
India that we have seen in the course of this study seems to throw up an
unmistakable trend of the declining power of landlords (feudal or otherwise), not by
any revolutionary means but just by the sheer pressure of demographic
developments and economic stagnation. The total land owned by the large
landholding families, the “big peasants” that Lenin refers to, have halved over the
last five decades and today they own only about 12 percent of the total land. On the
other hand, the land owned by medium-to-small landholding families has increased
to over 65 percent. Does this, along with other evidence on the decline of tenancy
and the increase of wage-labour, not indicate that the rural economy in India is
inexorably being pushed in the direction of peasant capitalism? How would this
important trend of the increasing dominance of peasant capitalism, and a gradual
whittling down of landlord capitalism, change the course of the agrarian revolution?
If landlords, as a class, are dwindling in economic and social power, is a programme
aimed at breaking their political power still relevant? Is the contradiction between
feudalism and the broad masses of the people still the principal contradiction in
India today?
Another issue that will need to be addressed in the context of the slogan for
redistributive land reforms is to see whether the resulting farms will be viable in any
meaningful economic sense. Let us recall that the average size of ownership holding
in India in 2003 was 0.81 hectares; so, the most equitable redistribution will result
CPI(M) and CPI(ML) Liberation explicitly recognize the current rural scenario in India as being characterized by landlord capitalism; this was most clearly formulated by Patnaik (1976,
1986) and finds its place in the CPI(M) programme accordingly; it also appears explicitly in
the agrarian programme of CPI(ML) Liberation, though there is no mention of Patnaik (1976,
1986). The CPI (Maoist), on the other hand, largely discounts the development of capitalist
relations in rural Indian. Characterization of Indian society can be found in the programmes
of the CPI(M), CPI(ML) Liberation and CPI(Maoist); links for the programmes are provided in
the references.
14
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in the average holding of this size. If instead land is only taken from those owning
more than 10 acres and all of it distributed among those currently owning less than
1 acre, then the average size of holding for those receiving redistributed land will
roughly become 1.25 acres.
If we juxtapose this with the cost of cultivation data, we can easily see that
agricultural units of approximately such sizes will not be economically viable in the
sense of being able to generate any substantial surplus product after sustaining a
decent level of consumption of the producers. It is extremely doubtful whether
these small farms can generate any economic surplus even after the onerous
relations of unequal exchange have been removed from the picture. Can they,
therefore, help in the industrialization effort by generating surplus or will they
instead require a net resource flow in their direction with subsidized credit, power,
inputs, technology, etc. to continuously keep them viable? This question is
extremely important as can be seen from the concrete experiences of the Russian
and Chinese revolutions.
The growth of capitalist relations in the Indian countryside, the continued
fragmentation of the land, the decline in tenancy, the unviability of small-scale
production and other related factors seem to suggest that collective forms of
agricultural production are gradually being pushed on to the historical agenda of
the revolutionary movements in India. Collective, cooperative and socialist forms of
large-scale agriculture probably need to be seriously considered as an option
emerging out of the very evolution of the material conditions of the vast masses of
the working people. The agenda of redistributive land reforms creating bourgeois
property in rural areas and facilitating capitalist development needs to be seriously
rethought, not because of some ideological reasons but because the development
of the agrarian structure seems to demand such a re-evaluation.
It is not that redistributive land reform is, either economically or politically, not
useful; it is extremely useful at this stage of Indian development and thus finds
pride of place in the programme of all the communist streams. Land reforms will
certainly help in increasing the consumption levels of the vast masses of the
peasantry from their current abysmally low levels; it will democratize the ownership
structure in rural society; it will help create an internal market for the accumulation
of capital; it will help break the stranglehold of the rural gentry over rural social and
political life. All these reasons undoubtedly make redistributive land reforms an
indispensable part of any strategy for the radical restructuring of Indian society.
Without in any way undermining the logic of land reforms in the present Indian
context we would also like to strike a cautionary note, following Paul Baran (1957),
against treating land reforms as a panacea for all economic problems of an
underdeveloped society such as India. The agrarian structure of rural India, with its
extremely low land-man ratio, suggests that the limits of the positive aspects of
redistributive land reforms will be reached pretty quickly; it will need to be
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positively transcended within a very short time. Hence, the transition from a focus
on redistributive land reforms and support for peasant capitalism to an emphasis on
collective ownership and production will need to be reckoned with from the very
beginning; both the agrarian structure and historical lessons suggest such an
emphasis.
The third large issue raised by our study concerns the mode of industrialization of
the Indian economy. It is relatively uncontroversial that a shift of the agricultural
population into the secondary and tertiary sectors will be required in order to raise
real incomes of the vast majority. How this transformation is to be achieved is the
question. The structural transformation required to relieve above-mentioned
pressures on agriculture cannot be left to the anarchy of the global capitalist
market. The “market-friendly” post-1991 period has been witness to a type of
growth that has resulted in rising inequality and increasing number of low-wage,
contingent and informal jobs. However the contradictions and problems of the preReform, “planning period” also need to be taken seriously. There is an urgent need
to break out of certain simple binaries and equations which have been imposed
upon us. The first binary is that between State-managed capitalism and marketoriented capitalism. India’s experience shows that the vast majority of the working
population has suffered greatly in both regimes. In our struggle against a
particularly predatory type of neoliberal capitalism (whose days may in any case be
numbered given the global crisis), we must not find ourselves unwittingly arguing
for a return to the bureaucratic and corrupt State. Rather the spectacular failure of
the neoliberal model can be an opportunity to demand greater decentralization and
more autonomous development. The various people’s movements have been
articulating precisely such a model of development.
The second simple equation is between rural areas and agriculture on the one hand,
and cities and industry on the other hand. The social and ecological contradictions
of the large-scale, capital intensive model of industrialization must be taken
seriously. Nowhere has this model produced high levels of employment in an
ecologically sustainable fashion while giving producers a say in the running of the
workplace. It is becoming increasingly clear that the economic viability of such
industrialization is obtained only by cost externalization. The Indian experience
points to the necessity for developing dispersed, low capital-intensity, sustainable
models of industry that nevertheless raise real incomes of the majority (see Datye
1997 for one such model). This is not a utopian pipe-dream but rather a historical
necessity if “development” is not to remain an unfulfilled promise for the majority of
Indians.
None of the above can be taken only as a demand for better or more enlightened
development policy. Rather it articulates what has already been emerging from
social and political movements and in turn seeks to ground the political demands in
an empirical and theoretical context. There is a need to extend revolutionary
people’s movements rooted in peasant agriculture and national resource struggles
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into the rural, semi-urban and urban industrial milieu. The urgent question here is
how can the dispersed industrial working class be effectively politically organized at
a national level? This working class does not always resemble the “classical”
doubly-free, urban industrial proletariat. Yet, our attempt here has shown that it
remains exploited nonetheless and can and should form an important component of
left revolutionary politics. Is an artisan-peasant alliance a possibility for the near
future?
There is a difference of opinion between the two of us on the question of the model
of industrialization that might fruitfully accompany efforts at a radical restructuring
of Indian society. One of us (AB) believes, as has been stated in the above
paragraphs, that a dispersed, low capital-intensity, sustainable model of
industrialization is the way forward. While we agree that the scale and geographic
dispersal of industrialization per se does not lead to its being more democratic or
ecologically sustainable, DB places more importance on the institutional setting
within which the industrialization effort is embedded. A small-scale industrialization
effort in the context of local level inequalities of class, caste and gender can
reinforce those inequalities and nullify all attempts at democratic control of the
production process; on the other hand, a large-scale, high capital intensity and
centralized industrialization effort within a socialist context might be amenable to
democratic control if the institutions of workers’ control are in place. DB believes
that the experience of the Russian and Chinese revolutions shows that petty
production of the artisanal variety cannot solve either the economic problems of the
vast masses of an underdeveloped country like India or the political problems of a
society embarking on the socialist path. Sustainability, for DB seems to have more
to do with proper cost-benefit analysis rather than the scale of production as such.
In a socialist context, where the surplus product of society is democratically
controlled, the pace and direction of technical change will be determined in a
rational and scientific manner and not left to the anarchy of capitalist production
and the imperatives of profit maximization. In such a setting, internalizing the
environmental costs of production would flow naturally from the imperatives of all
round social development.
It has been our effort in the present study to arrive a macro understanding of Indian
agriculture and Industry from the Marxist perspective. As our differing positions
advanced above indicate, we do not intend to argue for any one right solution to the
problems identified in the study. Rather we hope that the data and the
accompanying reflections and speculations will serve to fuel further discussions and
debate out of which visions for a future Indian society may emerge.
(We would like to thanks Debarshi Das, Gail Omvedt, Mohan Rao, Sukla Sen, Abhay
Shukla and Rahul Varman for helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper.)
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APPENDIX

Table A1: Average Size of Ownership Holding in India
1961-62
1971-72
1982
Estimated Area Owned (million ha)
128.73
119.64
119.74
Average area owned (ha)
Including landless
1.78
1.53
1.28
Excluding landless
2.01
1.69
1.44
Area Operated (millon ha)
133.48
125.68
118.57
Average area operated (ha)
2.63
2.2
1.67

1992
117.35

2003
107.23

1.01
1.14
125.1
1.34

0.73
0.81
107.65
1.06

Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.

1961
1971
1982
1992
2003

Table A2: Land Ownership Structure in Rural India by Ownership Size-Class
marginal
small
semi-medium
medium
% of households
66.06
9.16
12.86
9.07
% of area owned
7.59
12.39
20.54
31.23
% of households
62.62
15.49
11.94
7.83
% of area owned
9.76
14.68
21.92
30.73
% of households
66.64
14.70
10.78
6.45
% of area owned
12.22
16.49
23.58
29.83
% of households
71.88
13.42
9.28
4.54
% of area owned
16.93
18.59
24.58
26.07
% of households
79.60
10.80
6.00
3.00
% of area owned
23.05
20.38
21.98
23.08

large
2.85
28.25
2.12
22.91
1.42
18.07
0.88
13.83
0.60
11.55

Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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Table A3: Large Landholding States: Share of Area Owned by Ownership Size-Class
marsemimediu Larg
ginal small
medium
m
e
ANDHRA
PRADESH
2003
21.87 19.95
21.16
22.91
14.05
1992
21.30 22.44
24.15
24.06
8.06
1982
11.26 15.29
20.70
29.83
22.92
1971-72 9.92
13.16
21.19
30.15
25.58
GUJRAT
2003
13.60 16.05
18.96
39.12
12.28
1992
9.55
15.44
24.78
31.99
18.24
1982
6.66
10.78
22.63
39.45
20.49
1971-72 4.53
9.94
16.73
36.15
32.65
HARYANA
2003
13.15 15.83
24.62
34.14
12.26
1992
7.96
13.43
33.54
37.17
7.91
1982
5.04
13.44
21.58
44.90
15.05
1971-72 4.63
7.43
18.95
46.93
22.06
KARNATAKA
2003
16.65 19.45
23.18
29.52
11.20
1992
11.05 18.35
27.82
26.62
16.16
1982
6.21
13.56
25.40
31.45
23.38
1971-72 5.74
11.81
24.84
35.19
22.42
MADHYA
PRADESH
2003
11.61 19.07
25.80
31.25
12.29
1992
7.61
15.49
24.97
35.38
16.57
1982
4.99
11.08
24.30
37.93
21.72
1971-72 3.34
9.16
21.36
37.80
28.34
MAHARASHTRA
2003
12.38 17.57
30.88
27.35
11.78
1992
7.02
12.61
25.54
33.43
21.41
1982
4.65
10.90
20.82
36.23
27.40
1971-72 3.48
8.59
18.34
35.45
34.14
PUNJAB
2003
9.16
15.63
25.30
34.50
15.31
1992
7.18
12.35
30.21
38.04
12.22
1982
5.59
10.76
22.87
42.23
18.56
1971-72 4.47
8.87
25.06
37.96
23.64
RAJASTHAN
2003
9.26
11.19
18.61
28.40
32.52
1992
5.42
10.04
18.90
31.55
34.10
1982
3.63
7.29
17.29
35.19
36.59
1971-72 2.03
6.78
13.15
32.89
45.15
th
Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59 Round, January-December, 2003.
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Table A4: Small Landholding States: Share of Area Owned by Ownership
Size-Class
marsemiginal
small medium medium large
ASSAM
2003
44.42
34.87
16.36
4.32
0.00
1992
38.05
29.07
23.06
8.53
1.29
1982
24.53
34.81
27.67
11.50
1.48
1971-72 22.15
30.22
30.79
15.20
1.64
BIHAR
2003
42.07
25.29
18.53
9.56
4.63
1992
28.58
23.84
24.45
18.68
4.44
1982
23.96
22.91
27.02
20.22
5.90
1971-72 18.20
23.43
28.07
23.63
6.67
HIMACHAL PRADESH
2003
43.80
28.02
19.77
6.45
2.03
1992
34.99
20.35
21.57
18.50
4.60
1982
20.94
23.09
26.04
27.82
2.11
1971-72 21.22
23.43
25.92
23.12
6.31
J&K
2003
36.26
25.49
19.54
11.12
7.58
1992
25.52
33.40
25.84
15.23
0.00
1982
28.13
30.29
28.70
12.56
0.32
1971-72 27.41
39.33
25.20
8.06
0.00
KERALA
2003
60.72
21.13
10.78
7.16
0.00
1992
54.51
24.19
14.32
6.33
0.66
1982
45.74
23.51
19.11
10.06
1.59
1971-72 40.88
24.32
19.95
11.89
2.96
ORISSA
2003
41.52
27.06
19.72
9.98
1.78
1992
26.37
27.16
25.99
18.08
2.40
1982
19.88
29.73
25.04
19.50
5.84
1971-72 20.45
26.95
25.88
20.72
6.00
TAMIL NADU
2003
33.21
23.10
22.09
20.57
1.23
1992
33.28
26.24
24.15
12.15
4.18
1982
23.57
27.24
23.53
20.94
4.71
1971-72 20.23
21.84
25.21
22.97
9.75
UTTAR PRADESH
2003
34.89
27.38
20.74
14.65
2.34
1992
27.42
24.88
25.82
18.14
3.73
1982
20.36
24.08
28.11
22.25
5.18
1971-72 17.49
24.65
27.94
23.85
6.07
WEST BENGAL
2003
58.23
25.71
11.88
4.02
0.00
1992
41.29
28.11
22.98
7.62
0.00
1982
30.33
28.77
27.23
12.12
1.54
1971-72 27.28
25.69
27.72
18.61
0.70
Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.
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Table A5: Effective Landlessness in Rural India: Cumulative Distribution of Land Ownership Patterns over Time
1961-62
1971-72
1982
1992
2003
Area
Owned
0 ha
< 0.21 ha
< 0.41 ha

% of
hhlds
11.68
37.9
44.21

% of
area
0
0.54
1.59

% of
hhlds
9.64
37.42
44.87

% of
area
0
0.69
2.07

% of
hhlds
11.33
39.93
48.21

% of
area
0
0.9
2.75

% of
hhlds
11.25
42.4
51.36

% of
area
0
1.31
3.8

% of
hhlds
10.04
50.6
60.15

% of
area
0.01
2.08
5.83

Source: Report No. 491, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.

Table A6: Cultivators and Agricultural Workers in Rural India, 2001
CultivaAg WorkAgwrkr/C
tors
ers
ultiv
Andhra Pradesh
7757337
13384671
1.73
Arunachal Pradesh
275403
17634
0.06
Assam
3712769
1253451
0.34
Bihar
8075104
13145639
1.63
Goa
45885
31076
0.68
Gujarat
5697434
4983209
0.87
Haryana
2958215
1224403
0.41
Himachal Pradesh
1946890
92598
0.05
Jammu & Kashmir
1559633
227325
0.15
Jharkhand
3858788
2810671
0.73
Karnataka
6684521
5901934
0.88
Kerala
693986
1507081
2.17
Madhya Pradesh
10733516
7136391
0.66
Maharashtra
11569293
10314720
0.89
Orissa
4197912
4921925
1.17
Punjab
1998640
1394035
0.70
Rajasthan
12921374
2436566
0.19
Sikkim
131201
16952
0.13
Tamil Nadu
4773028
7533766
1.58
Tripura
310871
272712
0.88
Uttar Pradesh
21754799
12931317
0.59
Uttaranchal
1556202
244520
0.16
West Bengal
5585848
7240517
1.30
1187986
Total
49
99023113
0.83
Source: Census of India, 2001.
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Table A7: Share of Tenant Holdings by Operational
Size-Class
Percentage of tenant holdings
1960197019811991200261
71
82
92
03
Marginal
24.1
27
14.4
9.3
9.8
Small
25.1
27.8
17.9
14.9
10.7
Semi-medium
23.6
24.8
15.9
12.2
10.3
Medium
20.5
20
14.5
13.1
7.8
Large
9.5
15.9
11.5
16.7
13.8
All sizes
23.5
25.7
15.2
11
9.9
th
Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59 Round, January-December, 2003.

Table A8: Tenancy in the Major Indian States
share of tenant holdings
share of area leased in
19811991200219811991200282
92
03
82
92
03
ANDHRA PRADESH
13.8
14.1
12.9
6.2
9.6
9.0
ASSAM
12.9
10.1
8.9
6.4
8.9
5.3
BIHAR
19.7
5.6
12.7
10.3
3.9
8.9
GUJARAT
4.8
3.7
5.3
2.0
3.3
5.1
HARYANA
25.9
17.1
10.7
18.2
33.7
14.4
KARNATAKA
10.7
8.0
4.6
6.0
7.4
3.6
KERALA
6.7
5.2
5.1
2.6
2.9
4.0
MADHYA PRADESH
8.0
9.0
7.3
3.6
6.3
3.6
MAHARASHTRA
10.6
6.9
6.6
5.2
5.5
4.7
ORISSA
18.2
16.9
19.4
9.9
9.5
13.0
PUNJAB
21.3
15.9
13.1
16.1
18.8
16.8
RAJASTHAN
7.1
6.5
2.9
4.3
5.2
2.8
TAMIL NADU
24.7
15.3
9.4
10.9
10.9
6.0
UTTAR PRADESH
20.5
15.5
11.7
10.2
10.5
9.5
WEST BENGAL
23.1
14.4
14.1
12.3
10.4
9.3
Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59th Round, January-December, 2003.

81

Table A9: Share of Leased-in Area by Terms of Lease
196019701981terms of lease
61
71
82
1991-92
2002-03
incl
excl
incl
excl
n.r.
n.r.
n.r.
n.r.
fixed money
25.6
15.4
10.9
19
22.7
29.5
29.8
fixed produce
12.9
11.6
6.3
14.5
17.4
20.3
20.6
share of produce
38.2
47.9
41.9
34.4
41.1
40.3
40.8
Other
23.3
25.1
40.9
32.1
18.8
9.9
8.8
th
Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59 Round, January-December, 2003; n.r.=not
reported.

Table A10: Share of Area by Terms of Lease, Major Indian
States: 2002-03
fixed
share
from
fixed
proof prorelamoney
duce
duce
tives
other
ANDHRA
PRADESH
31.6
37.9
24.0
2.1
4.4
ASSAM
15.8
3.6
55.0
0.0
25.6
BIHAR
12.0
17.5
67.0
0.5
3.0
GUJARAT
10.7
46.3
37.9
3.5
1.6
HARYANA
71.2
9.8
15.8
0.1
3.1
KARNATAKA
32.4
41.1
24.8
0.0
1.7
KERALA
39.9
7.5
12.0
33.0
7.8
MADHYA
PRADESH
18.3
32.5
39.0
1.6
8.6
MAHARASHTRA
26.2
9.0
37.5
15.7
11.6
ORISSA
11.1
7.8
73.0
3.5
4.6
PUNJAB
79.2
1.5
15.3
3.1
0.9
RAJASTHAN
35.0
17.7
39.3
1.1
6.9
TAMIL NADU
32.0
30.0
22.9
7.3
7.8
UTTAR PRADESH
23.8
12.9
52.9
5.0
5.4
WEST BENGAL
23.7
28.5
34.9
4.1
8.8
INDIA
29.5
20.3
40.3
4.0
5.9
th
Source: Report No. 492, NSS 59 Round, January-December, 2003.
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Table A11: Share of Debt from Various Sources for Cultivator
Households (%)
1951
1961 1971 1981 1991 2002
Sources of Credit
Institutional
7.3
18.7
31.7
63.2
66.3
61.1
Cooperative Societies
3.3
2.6
22
29.8
30
30.2
Commercial Banks
0.9
0.6
2.4
28.8
35.2
26.3
Non-Institutional
92.7
81.3
66.3
36.8
30.6
38.9
Moneylenders
69.7
49.2
36.1
16.1
17.5
26.8
Unspecified
3.1
Source: Government of India, 2007.

Table A12: Gross Capital Formation in
Prices
GFCFA
CIS
GCFA
1961
59.02
3.77
62.79
1981
1962
54.68
0.23
54.91
1982
1963
58.33
2.00
60.33
1983
1964
62.72
2.77
65.49
1984

Agriculture at 1993-94
GFCFA
137.21
134.07
137.66
139.26

1965

68.14

1.14

69.28

1985

138.46

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

71.77
72.79
79.55
78.83
83.18
79.80
83.72
90.63
88.15
86.09
93.48

2.27
1.64
0.49
6.83
5.83
6.85
7.98
12.46
15.54
13.55
22.97

74.04
74.43
80.04
85.66
89.01
86.65
91.70
103.09
103.69
99.64
116.45

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

130.61
127.89
133.75
143.35
127.28
158.05
145.46
156.10
147.49
160.12
170.14

1977

113.56

30.99

144.55

1997

174.72

1978

115.85

17.21

133.06

1998

174.99

1979
129.97 51.99 181.96
1980
136.09 42.14 178.23
Source: Gulati and Bathla, 2002.

1999

179.79

CIS
5.12
6.72
7.63
7.99
11.0
2
10.7
1
9.19
9.19
4.27
6.96
6.11
4.19
5.31
5.00
8.31
8.70
12.9
1
11.8
1
10.3
3

GCFA
142.33
140.79
145.29
147.25
149.48
141.32
137.08
142.94
147.62
134.24
164.16
149.65
161.41
152.49
168.43
178.84
187.63
186.80
190.12
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Table A13: GDCF, GDP and Shares in 1993-94 prices
GDCF
(Rs bilGDP (Rs
GFCA/G
GDPA/
GDCF/G
Years
lion)
billion)
DCF
GDP
DP
1960-61
435.49
2221.61
14.42
40.53
19.6
1961-62
409.96
2305.72
13.39
39.61
17.78
1962-63
465.05
2375.2
12.97
37.61
19.58
1963-64
489.12
2519.79
13.39
38.52
19.41
1964-65
540.61
2707.27
12.82
40.36
19.97
1965-66
616.79
2638.64
12
38.14
23.38
1966-67
641.01
2634.41
11.61
39.21
24.33
1967-68
600.68
2839.76
13.32
41.92
21.15
1968-69
588.05
2938.17
14.58
40.79
20.01
1969-70
666.26
3130.39
13.36
40.51
21.28
1970-71
689.71
3292.27
12.56
39.09
20.95
1971-72
709.78
3348.42
12.92
37.28
21.2
1972-73
697.14
3329.12
14.79
37.19
20.94
1973-74
816.64
3434.73
12.7
40.3
23.78
1974-75
724.58
3475.53
13.75
37.39
20.85
1975-76
759.45
3794.04
15.33
34.48
20.02
1976-77
853.06
3858.69
16.94
32.69
22.11
1977-78
966
4137.81
13.77
34.18
23.35
1978-79
1112.5
4375.04
16.36
32.41
25.43
1979-80
981.59
4145.71
18.16
30.56
23.68
1980-81
981.91
4423.19
14.5
36.02
22.2
1981-82
991.98
4717.09
14.19
35.56
21.03
1982-83
991.99
4880.89
14.65
34.13
20.32
1983-84
1025.14
5216.87
14.36
34.98
19.65
1984-85
1112.26
5453.49
13.44
33.96
20.4
1985-86
1217.57
5766.54
11.61
32.35
21.11
1986-87
1219.78
6031.39
11.24
30.73
20.22
1987-88
1398.91
6265.59
10.22
29.19
22.33
1988-89
1584.54
6895.41
9.32
30.63
22.98
1989-90
1699.65
7325.78
7.9
29.25
23.2
1990-91
1956.5
7733.49
8.39
28.85
25.3
1991-92
1715.53
7815.75
8.72
28.1
21.95
1992-93
1874.77
8185.44
8.61
28.39
22.9
1993-94
1984.12
8592.2
7.69
28.16
23.09
1994-95
2421.13
9222.89
6.96
27.55
26.25
1995-96
2692.19
9928.77
6.64
25.37
27.12
1996-97
2638.83 10619.02
7.11
26
24.85

84

1997-98
2985.68 11103.84
1998-99
2975.18 11853.99
Source: Gulati and Bathla, 2002.

6.25
6.39

24.39
24.48

26.89
25.1
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